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Chapter 1: The Evolution of Privacy
It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly
be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent
of such protection is.1
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”2 The Amendment’s original purpose was to protect the citizens of the new
American republic from a replication of the abuses perpetrated by the British during the Colonial
period. “The founding generation sought to cabin the new government’s authority to engage in
searches and seizures and to limit the possibilities for abuses.”3
I. Origins of the Right to Privacy
From the early years of the republic through the Civil War, the Fourth Amendment achieved
its goal of protecting citizens from physical unwarranted intrusions into their persons, houses,
papers, and effects. However, in 1890, Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louise
Brandeis wrote what some consider to be the most influential law review article ever published:
“The Right to Privacy.” When the article was published, the ideas of a penumbra of rights
containing a right to privacy, or an expectation of privacy were not ones that had been
considered in constitutional jurisprudence, let alone Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

1

Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4 No.
Brian P. Smentkowski, “Fourth Amendment: United States Constitution,” Encyclopedia
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Warren and Brandeis’ article arose out of their recognition that certain conversations and
topics that once were understood to be private in nature had become the staple of America’s
ever-growing desire for gossip and tabloid media. “The press is overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and
of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”4
The invasion by the late nineteenth-century tabloids and newspapers into the previously private
life of individuals dictated that there must be protections put in place to allow the people to
exercise their “Right ‘to be let alone.’”5 Brandeis and Warren realized that societal changes,
society’s needs, and society’s expectations regarding privacy illustrated that the law must change
and adapt to the times, and to society, not the other way around.
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered
necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential
to the individual.6
The Brandeis and Warren article lay the foundation for the establishment of the right to
privacy by demanding that law evolve along with the requirements and expectations of society:
Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society … Gradually the scope of
these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy
life, —the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil
privileges; and the term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every form of possession—
intangible, as well as tangible.7
The article describes people’s inherent right to privacy, and argues that the courts must address
whether this right to privacy is one that the law is ready to recognize. “The question whether our

4

Warren and Brandeis, 196.
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law will recognize and protect the right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come
before our courts for consideration.”8
II. The Physical Trespass Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s first major case in the nearly one hundred-year struggle over the right
to privacy came in the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States. Olmstead involved bootleggers
during prohibition who were convicted of “[u]nlawfully possessing, transporting, and importing
intoxicating liquors and maintaining nuisances, and by selling intoxicating liquors.”9 Mr.
Olmstead was the leader of the conspiracy, which involved eleven other men. Law enforcement
intercepted communications between Mr. Olmstead and the other conspirators by having
“[s]mall wires [that] were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of four
of the petitioners and those leading from the chief office.”10 The placement of these small wires,
which were intended to overhear and intercept the messages of the conspirators, was done
without a warrant, and the petitioners argued that the Prohibition officers wiretapping their
conversations without a warrant had violated their right to privacy and their Fourth Amendment
rights.
The Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time of Olmstead followed the long-established
common law precedent that the only manner by which the government could violate the Fourth
Amendment, in regards to searches, was by physically trespassing onto the property or into the
home of the accused without a warrant. This common law doctrine was the main legal
philosophy questioned in the Brandeis and Warren article. Did the law only protect people
against physical invasion of their property? “The common law has always recognized a man's

8

Warren and Brandeis, 195.
Olmstead et al. v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
10
Id. at 456-457.
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house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to his own officers engaged in the execution of its
command.”11 Alternatively, would the Court stop unwanted invasions of privacy even when a
physical trespass had not occurred? Or as Brandeis and Warren noted, “Shall the courts thus
close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity?”12
In Olmstead, the Court did not heed the warning of Brandeis and Warren regarding the
capabilities of law enforcement becoming more advanced with each day.
The narrower [physical trespass] doctrine may have satisfied the demands of society at a time
when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen without violating a contract or
a special confidence; but now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the
perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the protection
granted by the law must be placed upon a broader foundation.13
Instead, ignoring this admonishment, the Court in Olmstead relied on the physical trespass
doctrine of the Fourth Amendment. “The insertions were made without trespass upon any
property of the defendants,”14 and as a result the Court decided,
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our
attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant unless
there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or
his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the
purpose of making a seizure. We think, therefore, that the wiretapping here disclosed did not
amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.15
By the time the Court decided Olmstead, Brandeis was a Justice on the Supreme Court, and
he reiterated the point he had made nearly forty years earlier in his law review article. He wrote
in his Olmstead dissent that the physical trespass doctrine was a dangerous and outdated Fourth
Amendment standard. He warned that both the days of required physical trespass by law
11

Warren and Brandeis, 220.
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enforcement in order to obtain evidence, and the days of the physical trespass doctrine being
sufficient protection for citizens were coming to a rapid end. In Olmstead, a law enforcement
officer now possessed the technology to avoid a physical trespass or presence to overhear the
planning of criminal activity, and instead could attach a few wires and overhear an entire
criminal organization or any citizen of their choosing.
‘Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.’ Subtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government.
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in
the closet. Moreover, ‘in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has, been but of what may be.’ The progress of science in furnishing the Government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. ‘That places the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer’ was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than
these. To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed ‘subversive of all the comforts of
society.’ Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security?16
It would not be until thirty-nine years later that the Court would begin to heed Brandeis’ warning
from Olmstead, and his famous law review article.
III. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, forever changed Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The case articulated a new standard for examining potential Fourth Amendment
violations by the Government. The new test was meant not only to replace the strict physical
trespass doctrine that the Court had used in Olmstead and in all other prior cases, but also to give
new protections in a world of constant technological change and innovation. In Katz the Court
realized that people needed greater protections from government intrusions, just as Brandeis had

16

Id. at 473-474, (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

10
warned in Olmstead. The case involved Charles Katz, who was charged with running an illegal
gambling operation and was caught by FBI agents who “[a]ttached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which calls were made.”17 Justice
Stewart wrote the opinion for the Court, in which he brought the right of privacy into the
discussion of the Fourth Amendment protections. His opinion discussed how technological
changes, such as the telephone booth, became so vital to private communication and to society in
general, that constitutional protections were required to adequately guard citizens against the
prying ears of the government.
But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye -- it was
the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a
place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.18
Justice Stewart wrote, not only that there was a right to privacy from the “uninvited ear”
when Katz closed the telephone booth door, but also that the days where the government could
claim, that the absence of a physical trespass prevented a violation of Katz’s Fourth Amendment
right, were over. “Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the
ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision
rested.”19
The new scope of Fourth Amendment protections was embodied by the new standard
articulated in Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s concurrence. “My understanding of the rule that
17
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has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”20 This test was applied to the facts of
Katz:
The critical fact in this case is that ‘[o]ne who occupies it [a telephone booth], shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume’ that
his conversation is not being intercepted. The point is not that the booth is ‘accessible to the
public’ at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants'
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable … That case established
that interception of conversations reasonably intended to be private could constitute a ‘search
and seizure.’ and that the examination or taking of physical property was not required.21
The new two-prong standard of exhibiting an actual expectation of privacy, one that society is
ready to recognize as reasonable, became the guiding Fourth Amendment test. The test has been
applied to numerous cases, including those that involve the highly controversial third-party
doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.
IV. The Creation of the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine in constitutional law was conceived in the 1976 decision United
States v. Miller, a case that involved a man who was distilling and selling un-taxed whiskey. The
police obtained copies of his bank records without a warrant. Miller argued that this violated his
subjective expectation to privacy in his private financial transactions with the bank, and that this
privacy expectation was one that society was ready to accept as reasonable. In Miller the Court
distinguished between a person’s private papers, which have robust Fourth Amendment
protections, and papers used in a commercial transaction. “On their face, the documents… are
not respondent’s ‘private papers.’ … Respondent can assert neither ownership nor possession.

20
21

Id. at 361, (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 361, (Harlan, J., concurring).

12
Instead, these are the business records of the banks.”22 Miller argued that he “[h]as a Fourth
Amendment interest in the records kept by the banks because they are merely copies of personal
records that were made available to the banks for a limited purpose and in which he has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”23 This is where the Court first introduces the third-party
doctrine, opening the door to the controversy that both Congress and the Supreme Court are still
dealing with today.
We perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their contents. The checks are not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees
in the ordinary course of business … The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court
has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.24
Simply stated, the third-party doctrine provides that when an individual disseminates
information to a third party, he no longer has a reasonable expectation to privacy in that
information, and, therefore, the individual loses all Fourth Amendment protection over this
information. And as a critical corollary, the government no longer needs a warrant to obtain this
information. Three years later, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, would solidify the
third-party doctrine’s place in constitutional jurisprudence; however, Smith would also highlight
the flaws of the third-party doctrine that continue in the modern-day interconnected and
globalized world.
Decided in 1979, Smith v. Maryland reinforced the view that information disseminated to a
third party by an individual no longer satisfied the two-pronged test from Katz. The question for
22
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the Court to consider in Smith was, “Whether the installation and use of a pen register constitutes
a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”25 This case again revolved around an
individual disseminating information to a company in order to conduct a necessary function in
society. Instead of conducting transactions with a bank, as in Miller, this time it was providing
numbers to the telephone company in order to be able to call other people. Just as in Miller, the
petitioner claimed that he had a subjective expectation of privacy that society was ready to
accept as reasonable in the numbers that one dialed from ones phone.26 The Court’s opinion,
written by Justice Blackmun, flat out rejects this argument, with a strong dismissal of the notion
that people appropriately believe they have a real expectation to privacy in the telephone
numbers that they dial.
This claim must be rejected. First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company
switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the
phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for
they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.27
Justice Blackmun reinforced the use of the third-party doctrine to dismiss the petitioner’s claims.
His opinion argued that even if the Court did accept that Smith had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed, his Fourth Amendment protection claim would still fall short of
satisfying the second prong of the Katz test, because it is not an expectation of privacy that
society is ready to accept as reasonable.
Even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed
would remain private, this expectation is not "one that society is prepared to recognize as
`reasonable.'” This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.28
25

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
27
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This absolute rejection of any expectation of privacy in information voluntarily handed over to
third parties, in this case phone numbers dialed, was not a unanimously held view of the Miller
Court, nor is it a view held by all Fourth Amendment scholars, past or present.
V. Objections to the Third-Party Doctrine
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall, highlights many of the issues with the majority’s
opinion, and the precedent it sets, not only in 1979, but also in its application to modern society,
modern technology, and the modern workplace. Justice Marshall did not simply believe that
because one gives up information to a business or any another third party for a specific purpose,
such as conducting a bank transaction or making a phone call, that one forfeits all Fourth
Amendment protections. “Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at
all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”29 His
dissent explains how the “assumption of risk,” by which “[i]ndividuals who convey information
to third parties have ‘assumed the risk,’ of disclosure to the government,”30 is “[m]isconceived in
two critical areas.”31 First Marshall believes that the majority was misguided and incorrect in
holding that, “Unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal
or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of
‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical mater, individuals have no realistic
alternative.”32 The use of a telephone, or conducting transactions at a bank, is an indispensable
and unavoidable practice of modern life. Every time an individual engages in one of these

29

Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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practices they assume the risk of being surveyed by the government, no matter how necessary
they are to function as a working contributing member of society.
Justice Marshall’s second objection to the majority opinion’s logic is that the Court expanded
the new ability of the government to discern and interpret the scope of the Fourth Amendment
and its protections for citizens in certain situations. In the majority opinion, the Court
understands the new immense power it has bestowed upon the government. However, it failed to
explain under what circumstances the Court would be able to, or be required to, step in and
question the justification claimed by the government in any particular case about the expansion
or contraction of police power under the Fourth Amendment.
More fundamentally, to make risk analysis dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of
privacy expectations would allow the government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections. For example, law enforcement officials, simply by announcing their intent to
monitor the content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations,
could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such
communications. Although acknowledging this implication of its analysis, the Court is
willing to concede only that, in some circumstances, a further ‘normative inquiry would be
proper.’ No meaningful effort is made to explain what those circumstances might be, or why
this case is not among them.33
Justice Marshall believes that a subjective expectation of privacy exists, and that it is one that
society is ready to recognize as legitimate even if the individual has disseminated information to
a third party. This is especially true if the information being disseminated is required for the
individual to be an active and positive contributor to modern society, or if the information must
be given to a third party to conduct their normal daily life. Marshall, in his dissent, argues that
he believes the judiciary must decide on a case-by-case basis whether an individual has a
subjective expectation to privacy that society is ready to recognize as reasonable with respect to
the specific information provided to a third party.

33
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In my view, whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends
not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third
parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society. By its
terms, the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures assigns to the
judiciary some prescriptive responsibility … courts must evaluate the "intrinsic character" of
investigative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth Amendment.
And for those ‘extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize [individuals'] sense of
security . . . more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required.’34
The third-party doctrine presents one of the most complex and important challenges facing
the Supreme Court. Given the momentous changes in surveillance and data collection
technology since the time of Olmstead, Katz, Miller, and Smith, the Court is now faced with the
challenging task of determining which of these controversial precedents is still valid in our
technologically connected and globalized modern world. The Court is not alone in this task, and
many scholars have attempted to articulate how the third-party doctrine should be applied, if at
all, by the courts or by the Congress. What follows is a brief description of the most influential
theories regarding the role of third-party doctrine interpretations of Fourth Amendment
protections today.
VI. Legal Scholars’ Support for the Third-Party Doctrine
In his article, “The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine,” legal scholar Orin Kerr recognizes the
importance of technology in society, and the increasing role of the third-party doctrine currently
and in the future. He says, “The topic is a timely one: Technological progress places more and
more communications in the hands of third parties, and the growing importance of new
technologies such as the internet has led to a renewal of the attacks on the third-party doctrine.”35
Kerr is one of the leading legal scholars on the Fourth Amendment, and he is one of the few legal
scholars who supports the principles of the third-party doctrine. He believes that, while it is not
34
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(January 1, 2009): 566, https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol107/iss4/1/.
35

17
perfect, it remains solid law that should continue to evolve symbiotically with technological
advances. He acknowledges that the pro-third-party doctrine position is not popular with legal
scholars or with some state judges, who have strong and vehement opposition to the doctrine.
He argues,
The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. It is the Lochner
of search and seizure law, widely criticized as profoundly misguided. Decisions applying the
doctrine ‘top the chart of [the] most-criticized fourth amendment cases. Wayne LaFave
asserts in his influential treatise that the Court's decisions applying it are ‘dead wrong’ and
‘make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment.' The verdict among commentators has been
frequent and apparently unanimous: The third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but horribly
wrong.' Even many state court judges have agreed. Over a dozen state Supreme Courts have
rejected the doctrine under parallel provisions of their state constitutions.36
Kerr understands he is arguing against the majority of scholars and even against some
members of the judicial branch, but his arguments present important and often overlooked
aspects of the third-party doctrine. These overlooked areas, Kerr believes, are crucial not only to
demonstrate the value of the third-party doctrine, but also to show the critical need for the thirdparty doctrine during the current technologically driven and evolving era. Kerr identifies two
main reasons why he supports the third-party doctrine:
The first and most important purpose is to maintain the technological neutrality of Fourth
Amendment rules. Use of third parties has a substitution effect: It takes open and public
portions of crimes and hides them from public observation. Without the third-party doctrine, savvy wrongdoers could use third-party services in a tactical way to enshroud the
entirety of their crimes in zones of Fourth Amendment protection. The result would allow
technology to upset the Fourth Amendment's traditional balance between privacy and
security, weakening the deterrent and retributive goals of criminal punishment. The thirdparty doctrine blocks this end-run around the traditional Fourth Amendment balance.37
According to Kerr, the third-party doctrine produces a precarious balancing act between
citizen’s privacy and the power of law enforcement, which has been and will continue to be
under great scrutiny as technology becomes more advanced and integrated into everyday life.
36
37
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Kerr argues that this critical balance is achieved, during these times, thanks to the third-party
doctrine’s ability to render technology as a neutral weapon for both law enforcement and
criminals. Kerr continues by asserting that without the third-party doctrine being properly
utilized by law enforcement, criminals would be able to use technology to skirt around the law,
resulting in the inadmissibility of evidence against the accused, or law enforcement’s inability to
acquire the evidence in the first place. It would upset the delicate balance between individual
freedom and protection from unreasonable and unwarranted government intrusions, and giving
law enforcement the tools and power necessary and to effectively gather evidence and convict
criminals in a technology-driven society.
The second reason Kerr supports the application of the third-party doctrine is because it
provides a bright line distinguishing what tools law enforcement may legally use. He argues,
[t]o foster ex ante clarity in Fourth Amendment rules. The on/off switch of the suppression
remedy demands clear Fourth Amendment rules on what police conduct triggers Fourth
Amendment protection and what police conduct does not.' The third-party doctrine creates ex
ante clarity by matching the Fourth Amendment rules for information with the Fourth
Amendment rules for location. Under the doctrine, rights in information extinguish when the
information arrives at its destination. This means that the present location of information
defines the Fourth Amendment rules for collecting it, and the Fourth Amendment rules are
constant within each location.38
Kerr supports the third-party doctrine because it applies a clear-cut line, based upon where
the information in question is stored, to determine whether the potential evidence is within the
police power to obtain without a warrant. Consider the example of someone recording the
numbers they have dialed on their home phone in a notebook beside the- telephone when the
police enter this person’s home, without a warrant, and take the notebook. This is a clear
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the third-party doctrine is not part of the discussion.
However, if the police go to the telephone company and obtain a copy of the suspect’s telephone
38
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records, Kerr says this demonstrates a correct and proper exercise of law enforcement power
under the third-party doctrine. According to Kerr, the doctrine draws a clear and unambiguous
line for Fourth Amendment cases: the location of the information obtained by law enforcement
dictates unequivocally whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation, and if the police
lawfully exercised their power. The clarity provided by the third-party doctrine is one of the
main aspects that makes it attractive and viable in application by the Court; however, Kerr
understands that it is not perfect and it is not the only possible solution. In addition, it has been
nearly impossible for the courts or legal scholars to develop a clear-cut and well-reasoned
framework to replace the third-party doctrine, and this is another reason why Kerr supports the
doctrine.
Without the third-party doctrine, courts would have to develop some alternative test, with the
same ex ante clarity, for identifying when information is protected under the Fourth
Amendment. This task may not be impossible, but it is quite difficult. Few critics of the
third-party doctrine have tried. And the difficulty of devising a clear alternative to the thirdparty doctrine provides a second argument in its favor.39
Kerr is not arguing that the third-party doctrine is appropriate in all cases. When he
considers a cost-benefit analysis of the doctrine in its application to Fourth Amendment law, the
benefits outweigh the costs. The need for change in the third-party doctrine is not in question.
Kerr understands that technology has changed since the time of Miller and Smith, but he
contends that the solid legal principle of the third-party doctrine should not be abandoned, but,
instead, should be carefully reworked. “The importance of third-party records in new
technologies and the continuing criticisms of the Court's case law suggest that the time has come
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for courts and commentators alike to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the thirdparty doctrine. The doctrine should be recast rather than cast aside.”40
In his article Kerr not only discusses the crucial advantages of the third-party doctrine, but he
also examines two of the most relevant critiques of the doctrine. The first critique of the thirdparty doctrine is the doctrinal critique, which focuses on the legal arguments themselves. The
doctrinal critique employs the Katz test:
According to, critics, individuals normally expect privacy in their bank records, phone records, and other third-party records. Such expectations of privacy are common and
reasonable, and Justices who cannot see that are simply out of touch with society and are
misapplying the Fourth Amendment. From this perspective, it ‘defies reality’ to say that a
person ‘voluntarily’ surrenders information to third parties like banks or telephone
companies. As Justice Marshall reasoned in his Smith dissent, ‘[i]t is idle to speak of
'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative.'41
The doctrinal critique emphasizes that simply because someone has handed over information
to a third party does not mean that they lose all or any of ones expectation to privacy protections
of the information. Some scholars and justices believe that this is a too narrow reading of the
Fourth Amendment by the Court because in many instances the information given to a third
party is not voluntarily conveyed. Nevertheless, giving this information to a third party is
required for an individual to be a functional and productive member of society. This narrow
reading may have held true for people using deposit slips at the bank in 1976, and phone
numbers to make phone calls in 1979. But the real challenge to the third-party doctrine in the
modern technology age comes in the form of emails, texts, phone calls, Facebook messages, and
every other form of communication and interaction which are absolutely necessary not just in a
modern social context, but also in nearly all modern workplaces. The use of the internet, email,
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text messages, and most other technology now requires information to be given to one or more
third parties. According to this line of thinking, if the Court cannot realize that people do not
assume a risk when they are simply preforming the everyday tasks that are necessary to do their
job and interact with other individuals in today’s society then their ability to answer the
questions presented by technologies clash with the Fourth Amendment will be severely
compromised. As a result, then the Court is truly out of touch with reality and must reconsider
the application and intent of the third-party doctrine.
The doctrinal critique continues by challenging one of the parts of the doctrine Kerr supports,
which is the ex-ante clarity. In his dissent in Smith, Justice Marshall was the first to warn about
the Court’s adherence to an all-or-nothing policy regarding privacy, especially privacy
surrounding information given to a third party. This warning has been heeded and accepted by
many scholars and is one of the main critiques of the third-party doctrine..
A corollary to this claim is that the Justices supporting the third-party doctrine have
misunderstood the concept of privacy. The Justices envision privacy as an on-off switch,
equating disclosure to one with disclosure to all, and as a result they miss the many shades of
gray. As Justice Marshall put the point in Smith, “privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone
company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be
released to other persons for other purposes.” Echoing Justice Marshall, Daniel Solove
argues that the third-party doctrine is based on an incorrect “conception of privacy,” a
conception of privacy as total secrecy. Along the same lines, Richard Posner argues that the
Miller line of cases is “unrealistic.” “Informational privacy does not mean refusing to share
information with everyone,” he maintains, for “[o]ne must not confuse solitude with
secrecy.” Sherry Colb agrees, writing that “treating exposure to a limited audience as
identical to exposure to the world' fails to recognize the degrees of privacy.”42
The other critique that Kerr examines is called the functional critique of the third-party
doctrine. This critique examines how the government, under the third-party doctrine, is provided
too much power over people, in order to allow them to fully participate in a free, honest, and
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open society. Kerr uses Justice Harlan’s dissent in United States v White where he argued that
allowing the government to use an undercover informant wearing a wire in an unregulated
context would grant the government too much power, and take away too much privacy from the
individual. Justice Harlan says,
Were third party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that spontaneity
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse that liberates daily life.
Much offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count on the obscurity of his
remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener
will either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener's inability to reformulate a
conversation without having to contend with a documented record. All these values are
sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited only
by the need to locate a willing assistant.43
Kerr cites Marshall’s dissent in Smith again to show that he also believed that unchecked power
of the government due to unfettered access to information disseminated to a third-party would
have a chilling effect on society.
The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly prove disturbing
even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular
political organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to
avoid disclosure of their personal contacts. Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and
journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society.44
VII. Legal Scholars’ Objections to the Third-Party Doctrine
While Kerr presents one of the few arguments in support of the third-party doctrine, there are
many different arguments against the doctrine, especially in the modern technology era.
Michael Price in his article, “Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment Papers and the Third-Party
Doctrine,” presents arguments for the inapplicability of many Fourth Amendment doctrines, in
particular the third-party doctrine, to modern day society with its ever-expanding use of
technology and communications involving third-party systems. “If the Supreme Court intends to
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afford greater privacy protection to personal data stored electronically, as it seems inclined to do,
then it may want to consider a new analytical framework for the job. Existing Fourth
Amendment tests are not fit for the digital long haul.”45 He recognizes that there is no need for
an entire overhaul of Fourth Amendment tests and jurisprudence; rather, their needs to be
adaptations made to recognize the immense and perpetually increasing role of technology in
modern-day society. In Price’s view, “The framework is compatible with existing Fourth
Amendment tests; there is no need to displace them entirely. But the proliferation of highly
personal third-party data demands an avenue for Fourth Amendment analysis that is cognizant of
its role in society.”46 Price illustrates why the third-party doctrine simply cannot function in a
society where nearly every action of a person going about ones daily life and work is recorded by
a third party in some form or capacity. Allowing the government to access all this information
about an individual’s information amounts to one of the most serious threats to privacy this
country has ever witnessed.
Almost every aspect of online life now leaves a trail of digital breadcrumbs in the form of
third-party records. Every phone call, every email, every search and click online can create a
third-party record. Google, for example, keeps a copy of every search it is asked to make and,
if possible, links each search to a particular user. There are even records of what people do
not read and do not click. If courts take the third-party doctrine seriously, then police can
lawfully obtain all of this information without a warrant or probable cause. It is no hyperbole
to say that even a person’s mere curiosity could and would be monitored. As Daniel Solove
observes, ‘[T]his state of affairs poses one of the most significant threats to privacy in the
twenty-first century.’47
Price next discusses, as Justice Marshall did in Smith, the inapplicability of the third-party
doctrine as an all-or-nothing conceptualization of privacy. Again he points out how this doctrine
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does not work in the current digital era and will not work in the future. He also echoes the
worries that both Marshall and Harlan had, in Smith and White respectively, about how this allor-nothing approach would create a world where police could request every utterance and every
movement of a person. This would have the chilling effect of rendering American society less
free and open as it once had been. As Price argues,
The third-party doctrine is especially problematic in the digital age because it treats privacy
as a binary equation: either information is completely secret, or it is absolutely public. This
principle is at odds with the way that people share information online. As with other types of
personal interaction, sharing digital data is not an all-or-nothing endeavor; it is more like a
sliding scale that users may control (although not always with success). Depending on the
social media context, one may opt to comment anonymously, to send a message to just a few
friends, or to post a public video on YouTube in search of worldwide Internet fame. The
third-party doctrine disregards this nuance, treating everything as public. As more of life
takes place online, the doctrine becomes more devastating to freedom of speech and
association. Imagine a society where every thought, every utterance, every behavior
conveyed through digital means is ‘public’ information, cataloged in a database, just waiting
for the police to request it. The resulting chill to freedom of speech and association would
cause an ice age.48
With the problems of the third-party doctrine in the technology-driven twenty-first century
well established, Price discusses how his solution to the third-party doctrine problem involves an
expansion of the meaning of “papers,” from the language of the Fourth Amendment, to
encompass a meaning consistent with current and future technology.
In this framework, the particular form or format of the data is not terribly important. The
inquiry, in other words, should be technology-neutral. If ‘papers’ include private
correspondence in the mail, then the same constitutional protection should carry forward to
new and alternative modes of communication, whatever they may be. Phone calls, for
example—sound waves transmitted over copper wire—are an essential form of private
communication, deserving equal Fourth Amendment protection as parchment sealed with
wax. Privacy should not become a casualty of technology. Letters, telegraphs, phone calls,
emails, and text messages—they are all forms of private communication and would therefore
be treated as ‘papers’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.49
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Redefining the definition of what a “paper” means under the Fourth Amendment would not be an
easy task for the judiciary; however, it will provide a significantly more appropriate framework
and guide to deal with current and future technology and its inevitable collision with the thirdparty doctrine.
VIII. A World Without Privacy
The next critique of the third-party doctrine does not just seek a reformulation of the
doctrine, but a reformulation of the expectations of privacy in a society. Paul Ohm questions the
very nature of whether privacy still exists in modern society due to the amount of information
that is shared with third parties, with friends and family, and with private technology companies.
Ohm questions that if there is no privacy left in the world, does the Fourth Amendment still hold
any power, and if it does then what would be the constraints on the power of the government to
acquire all these records given to third parties by individuals?
Does that amendment [‘s] “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” survive once the police can request
from the private sector the fruits of comprehensive, consensual private surveillance? Were
we unthinkingly to extend current Fourth Amendment doctrine, the answer to these questions
might be no. If we woke up tomorrow in a world without privacy, we might also find
ourselves in a world without constitutional protection from new, invasive police powers. This
bleak scenario is not science fiction, for tomorrow we will likely wake up in that world.50
Ohm is extremely concerned that the trend of individuals using devices and services through a
third party that will track and store every aspect of one’s life. As a result under the current
Fourth Amendment doctrines an Orwellian 1984-type society exists. In this society, law
enforcement will be able to use warrantless searches to track people’s movements, and learn
unlimited information on every American.
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As the surveillance society expands, the police will learn to rely more on the products of
private surveillance, and will shift their time, energy, and money away from traditional selfhelp policing, becoming passive consumers rather than active producers of surveillance.
Private industry is destined to become the unwitting research and development arm of the
FBI. If we continue to interpret the Fourth Amendment as we always have, we will find
ourselves not only in a surveillance society, but also in a surveillance state.51
Ohm notes that while many scholars have conflicting views about the third-party doctrine, none
are willing to take the discussion to the place he is, a world where privacy no longer exists.
“These authors have all recognized, to greater or lesser extent, that privacy is on the decline or
has rapidly been redefined, but these middle-strength observations and predictions have given
rise to proportionate half measures.”52 Ohm’s entire argument hinges upon changing the
underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment thinking from an argument that is based upon balancing
privacy and security, to one that centers around the dispersion of power between the state and the
individuals. “Privacy has served as a useful proxy for deciding what the Fourth Amendment
protects. As we witness the rapid decline of privacy, we should be prepared to rebuild the Fourth
Amendment on a new foundation focused on the balance of power between the state and its
citizens.”53
Ohm argues that in order to achieve the desired balance in his privacy-less society a new test
must be put into place. Under his formulation, the critical test of how high a burden should be
placed on police before they many access and use this new technology must ask who will bear
the more significant injury should errors in use of the new technology occur. Ohm believes that
under the current third-party doctrine, society and the people bear the cost of the errors
committed by law enforcement when the police use new technology involving a third party in
order to conduct investigations or arrest an individual; however, in a society with diminished or
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no privacy, the cost of errors should fall directly upon law enforcement, which should bear the
burden in order to use a new device, a new database, or new surveillance technique.
The cost of errors should be borne first by the police. Whenever a private company enables a
new form of surveillance, the police should be forced to assume that access to the fruits of
the surveillance requires a warrant and probable cause until we know (with the assistance of
metrics) that the new service benefits criminals more than it helps the police.54
IX. Modern Legal Applicability of the Third-Party Doctrine
While all of these scholarly arguments for and against the third-party doctrine are well
thought out and well constructed, they may have only limited impact on the doctrine’s direction.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in United States v. Jones, provided the first insight into what the
current Court—or at least one member of the Court—may be thinking about the third-party
doctrine in today’s technologically advanced society. Justice Sotomayor, who harkens back
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Smith, focuses on the problem that a large amount of
information given to third parties by individuals today is not given voluntarily due to the need to
be a functioning member in a free and open society. Furthermore, she believes that this
information, even though it is given to a third party, absolutely garners a subjective expectation
of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. As a result, she believes it may very
well be time to reconsider the application of the third-party doctrine in this technology age.
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose
the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit
and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and
the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice
Alito notes, some people may find the ‘tradeoff’ of privacy for convenience ‘worthwhile,’ or
come to accept this ‘diminution of privacy’ as ‘inevitable,’ and perhaps not. I for one doubt
that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of
a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the
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societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.55
While this may only be the opinion of one Justice it is a strong rebuke of the third-party doctrine.
Moreover, the concurring opinion by Justice Alito in Jones, in which four other justices joined,
though not nearly as strong, made some very conspicuous references to the possibility of the
Court looking into the application of the third-party doctrine in the twenty-first century digital
age.
This chapter has laid the foundation upon which the third-party doctrine is built, not only
from a case law perspective, but also from the viewpoint of prominent Fourth Amendment
scholars. The following chapters will dive much deeper into the legal, legislative, and scholarly
debate surrounding technology and the Fourth Amendment, the balance between police power
and individual privacy, and the third-party doctrine. Chapter Two will present the modern
technology Fourth Amendment cases such as Kyllo, Jones, and Riley and how they have
culminated in the pending Supreme Court case of Carpenter v. United States.
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Chapter 2: The Fourth Amendment and Modern Technology
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties…This
approach is ill suited in the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.56
The Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine in the late 1970s in Smith and Miller. In
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s the doctrine was relatively uncontroversial; however, by the 2000s,
the development of more sophisticated technology started to rapidly outpace the evolution of
Fourth Amendment case law. The architects of the Fourth Amendment had no way of predicting
how technology would advance, or to what degree, and at what pace technology would evolve.
They created the amendment to protect themselves and their fellow citizens from the issue of the
writs of assistance issued by the British government before and during the Revolutionary War.
The framers had no way of conceiving the advent of automobiles, cell phones, emails,
computers, or a tool as powerful as the Internet. This chapter will focus on the how the Court
has dealt with the clash between digital era technology and analogue era doctrines and
precedents.
I. Kyllo v. United States
The Court first considered the possible impact of new technology on the existing Fourth
Amendment law in Kyllo v. United States. This case, decided in 2001, concerned police using a
thermal imager to detect infrared radiation, the radiation emitted by most objects, which cannot
be seen by the human eye. A thermal imaging scan shows heat signatures of the radiation. This
is significant, because in order to grow marijuana indoors, one “typically requires high intensity
lamps.”57 Agent William Elliot used a thermal imager to scan Danny Kyllo’s house to see if Mr.
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Kyllo was using high intensity lamps. After explaining the basic facts of the case, and the
foundational underpinnings of the Court’s technology-based jurisprudence, Justice Scalia states,
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology. For example, as the
cases discussed above make clear, the technology enabling human flight has exposed to
public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the
house and its curtilage that once were private. See Ciraolo, supra, at 215. The question we
confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy.58
Implicit in Scalia’s statement is, no matter what a Justice’s philosophy about originalism or in a
living evolving Constitution, it must be recognized that technological innovation is relevant to
the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions. Scalia continues his argument by discussing Katz and
the reasonable expectation of privacy test. He understands that the use of technology by police
in order to gather evidence against criminals will need a case-by-case interpretation; however, he
will not accept that technology will require or allow for diminished privacy protections in the
most revered and protected institution in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the home.
While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as telephone booths,
automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences is at issue, in the
case of the search of the interior of homes the prototypical and hence most commonly
litigated area of protected privacy there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to
be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit
police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.59
Scalia’s forward-looking opinion is not one that solely answers the question presented in Kyllo;
but in addition he is doing what justices must often do, and that is consider how their current
decision will impact future cases. Such opinions are especially important when technological
innovation is occurring so rapidly.
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We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone
booth. Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology–including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.60
Scalia imagined cases such as United States v. Jones, Riley v. California, and Carpenter v.
United States, in which the Court is confronted with more complex and pressing questions about
the Fourth Amendment’s application, including the application of the third-party doctrine to the
modern, technology-driven society.
II. United States v. Jones
In United States v. Jones, the Court dealt with, “Whether the attachment of a GlobalPositioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”61 The police attached a GPS tracking device to
the bottom of Mr. Jones’ car and recorded his whereabouts for twenty-eight days. The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous opinion, ruled that the use of a GPS did in fact violate Mr. Jones’ Fourth
Amendment rights. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion seemed to take a step back in time from his
opinion in Kyllo. Scalia’s analysis applied the physical trespass doctrine highlighted in the
Olmstead decision, while the concurring opinions by Alito and Sotomayor, drove at the heart of
the growing incongruence between the digital age and the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. “Yet, while the Jones majority did little to stop the erosion of Fourth Amendment
protections because it focused exclusively on the government's trespass on the defendant's
vehicle, the two concurrences suggest future judicial evaluation of changing expectations of

60
61

Id. at 35-36.
United States v. Jones 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).

32
privacy in the digital age.”62 While Alito and Sotomayor agree with the outcome of the case,
Alito questioned the grounds and reasoning of the majority opinion, and Sotomayor focuses on
the applicability of the third-party doctrine in the digital age. This does not mean that Alito
completely ignores the third-party doctrine in the digital age. Rather, he just has a different
approach to how the issue should be solved, which could impact how he and other members of
the Court vote on the pending Carpenter case.
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion begins by echoing Justice Scalia’s majority opinion from
Kyllo. He says, “This case requires us to apply the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21st-century surveillance technique.”63 Beyond that
opening however, Alito diverges from Scalia’s analysis, by criticizing and questioning the entire
base of the Scalia’s majority opinion. Alito believes the physical trespass doctrine utilized by the
majority is not only outdated in the post-Katz line of cases, but also creates many future
problems in cases involving technology and the Fourth Amendment:
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited… In sum, the majority is hard pressed to find support in post-Katz cases
for its trespass-based theory. Disharmony with a substantial body of existing case law is only
one of the problems with the Court’s approach in this case.64
Alito goes on to list the four additional problems that he believes the majority opinion will create
for the Court in the future.
First, the Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for
the purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that
most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object
that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation)… Second, the Court’s approach
leads to incongruous results… Third, under the Court’s theory, the coverage of the Fourth
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Amendment may vary from State to State… Fourth, the Court’s reliance on the law of
trespass will present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is
carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be
tracked.65
III. Judicial or Legislative Solution
For all the problems that technology presents to the Fourth Amendment and citizen’s privacy,
Alito believes that the solution lies not in opinions written by the Court but by legislation passed
by Congress. The solution should come from Congress, not the nine justices on the Court,
identifying and codifying privacy and privacy expectations in the twenty-first century. Alito
understand and recognizes that the times have changed, and that the expectations of privacy in
society have evolved due to technology, and will continue to evolve as the nature and
sophistication of available technology changes. This will result in the need to have those
changes reflected in the law, due to the actions and legislation by Congress, especially when it
comes to the Fourth Amendment.
In addition, the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has
a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those
expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.
New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy,
and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome
the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile
themselves to this development as inevitable.66
Alito believes that it is well within the right, power, and capability of Congress to enact
legislation to reflect the constantly changing expectation of privacy that the people of the United
States have, and will continue to have. He wants Congress to use its enforcement power to
codify privacy expectations in a way which the Court would never be able to do. In Alito’s
view, Congress is far better suited to conduct research to understand what people hold as a
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subjective expectation of privacy, what society is ready to accept as reasonable, and what tradeoffs people are willing to make in terms of security and convenience, for privacy protections.
Congress has shown the ability to accomplish this before with wiretapping when they passed the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). Although the ECPA does not account
for the advanced level of technology used today, the ECPA still shows that Congress has used its
power before to regulate the use of technology by the government when it comes to Fourth
Amendment issues.
On the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of
legislation to protect against these intrusions. This is what ultimately happened with respect
to wiretapping. After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to develop a body
of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly
enacted a comprehensive statute, see 18 U. S. C. §§2510–2522 (2006 ed. and Supp. IV), and
since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not
by case law.67
Alito believes that a legislative solution would allow for the necessary clarity to be gained on the
complex issue of government surveillance, and use of technology as it pertains to the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens in the technology era. Whether the legislature or the Court is the
best vehicle to answer these questions will be discussed in the coming chapters.
By contrast, in her separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor believes that it will be up to the
Court to deal with the relationship between privacy and technology. Justice Sotomayor agrees
with Justice Alito about the impact that technology will have in shaping the future of Fourth
Amendment cases. She says, “As Justice Alito incisively observes, the same technological
advances that have made possible non-trespassory surveillance techniques will also affect
the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”68 Society’s changing
expectations must be taken into account when applying not only the Katz test moving forward,
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but also, in the Court’s view of how technology and the Fourth Amendment work and function
together. “Justice Sotomayor’s decision…went further than Justice Alito in emphasizing the
importance of updating the Court’s evaluation of expectations of privacy.”69 As Lauren Elena
Smith showcases in her article, “Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of
United States v. Jones,” Justice Sotomayor states her belief that the Court must take action to
update people’s expectations of privacy in the digital age by dealing with the outdated analogue
third-party doctrine.
She took the critique one step further by examining more circumstances in which the Court
should update its conception of what is reasonable given the norms to which society has
adjusted. By highlighting several shortcomings of current judicial treatment of ‘voluntary’
communication of information, Justice Sotomayor brought attention to circumstances in
which citizens do currently have an expectation of privacy that is not currently recognized by
the Court.70
Sotomayor analyzes the main issue of the third-party doctrine in the digital era from two
different angles.
Justice Sotomayor focused on two primary circumstances in which voluntary communication
of information [to a third party] enabled by technology leads to exploitation of citizens’
expectation of privacy that the Katz test should protect: first, the ability of third-party
information collectors to pass information to the government and, second, the ability of law
enforcement to easily and warrantlessly ascertain and aggregate the totality of a persons
movements.71
The government’s ability to collect “voluntarily” surrendered information from third parties,
such as Internet service providers or phone companies—information that contains an
unprecedented degree of private and intimate information—is growing daily. Also, not only is
the sheer volume of information increasing, but also the intimate and private nature of
information available from third parties. However, though the amount and intimacy of the
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information that the government can obtain from third parties has dramatically increased, at the
same time the privacy protection afforded to the individual regarding that information has not.
This is the first issue that Sotomayor feels the Court must address going forward. People have an
expectation of privacy in the information that they relay to third parties today, because it touches
every aspect of their daily lives and work. “People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or
text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they
purchase to online retailers.”72 Sotomayor notes how the government is able to aggregate such a
massive amount of private and intimate information in a way in which they never were
previously capable. Not only can the government obtain this information in massive quantities
and depth as they never could before, but also they can do so more easily than at any other time
in history.
The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into
the future… I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movement will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less
at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.73
She discusses how these “voluntary” acts of giving information to a third party are not voluntary
in today’s world, and yet the doctrine from years ago is still the controlling precedent.
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. E.g.,
Smith, 442 U. S., at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). This approach is
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.74
Although the concurring opinions of Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor apply different
analysis, it seems clear that within the Court there is a recognition that there is a need for broader
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protections has increased from the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, to the time of the
Olmstead and Katz decisions, and finally to the time of the third-party doctrines creation in Smith
and Miller. However, the extent of this required increase in privacy and which branch of
government will implement this increase is still being debated and decided by the Court.
IV. Riley v. California
In Riley v. California the Court continued to rework the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
response to changing technology and an individual’s constant interaction with technology in ones
daily life. Although the decision in Riley does not directly implicate the Court’s third-party
doctrine, it holds a potentially key feature of the currently pending Cell Site Location
Information (CSLI) case, Carpenter v. United States. Mr. Riley had been stopped for a traffic
violation, which resulted in him being arrested on weapons charges. The arresting officer,
without a warrant, “accessed information on [Riley’s] phone and noticed the repeated use of a
term associated with a street gang.”75 Some hours later, a special agent, who was a gangs expert,
went through the digital contents of the phone, still without a warrant, and concluded:
Based in part on photographs and videos that the detective found, the State charged Riley in
connection with a shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier and sought an enhanced
sentence based on Riley’s gang membership. Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the
police had obtained from his cell phone.76
The issue presented in Riley was whether law enforcement needed a warrant to search the digital
contents of an arrested person’s cellphone. The Court, in a unanimous decision written by Chief
Justice Roberts, held that a warrant was required to search the contents of an arrested person’s
cellphone. The Court based its holding not only on the fact that incident to arrest warrant
exception does not apply to the contents of a cellphone, but also the Court used this case again to
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demonstrate how the evolution and advancement of technology requires Fourth Amendment case
law to evolve in order to properly protect individual privacy rights.
Phones are based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago… Absent more
precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given
type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’77
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the government’s argument that searching the millions of personal
points of data available by searching a phone is “materially indistinguishable”78 from the search
of physical persons or effects on a suspect at the time of an arrest. Roberts noted that the two
concepts are entirely incompatible with the recognized privacy expectations under the Fourth
Amendment in the modern digital age.
The United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is “materially
indistinguishable” from searches of these sorts of physical items. Brief for United States in
No. 13–212, p. 26. That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else
justifies lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. A
conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substantial
additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical
items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.79
The Chief Justice continues, explaining why cell phones, and in particular, the data that is stored
on them must be treated differently as a matter of law. Not only is the device able to make calls,
but it also has the capacity to perform countless other functions, and store countless amounts of
data all within a person’s pocket, backpack, or purse.
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might
be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many
of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as
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a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars,
tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.80
The capabilities of a cell phone are undeniable, but what truly sets modern smart phones apart
from devices or papers previous generations of suspects held on their person is the storage
capacity and the details that the digitally stored content on a person’s phone can reveal about
them.
One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense
storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities
and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy. See Kerr,
Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 404–405
(2013). Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past
several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read—nor
would they have any reason to attempt to do so. And if they did, they would have to drag
behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant in Chadwick, supra, rather
than a container the size of the cigarette package in Robinson.81
Chief Justice Roberts and other members of the Court understand that the current storage
capacities of phones will not diminish or remain where they are; they will only grow as the
technology becomes better. This will create and widen the gap between the amount of
information one could physically have on them when arrested, and the amount of digital
information stored on their phones. “We expect that the gulf between physical practicability and
digital capacity will only continue to widen in the future.”82 The privacy interests of the
information on a phone lie in four different compartments for the Court, and all of them factor
into the Court’s unanimous decision that police need a warrant before searching the intimate and
voluminous information stored on a arrestee’s cell phone.
The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated consequences for privacy. First, a
cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a
prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any
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isolated record. Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to
convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions;
the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A person might
carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a
record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would
routinely be kept on a phone.83
The final connection between the storage capacity of modern day cell phones and privacy
leads perfectly into the issues presented in the Carpenter case: the “voluntary” nature of owning
a smart phone in modern society.
Finally, there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical
records. Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal
information with them as they went about their day. Now it is the person who is not carrying
a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception. According to one poll, nearly
three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the
time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower. See Harris
Interactive, 2013 Mobile Consumer Habits Study (June 2013). A decade ago police officers
searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled across a highly personal item such as
a diary… But those discoveries were likely to be few and far between. Today, by contrast, it
is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell
phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the
mundane to the intimate… Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis
is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional
case.84
Having a cell phone in modern society is not a voluntary act or a status symbol; it is a required
tool for people’s jobs, social lives, and everything in between. The voluntary aspect of owning
and using a cell phone, which interacts thousands of times a day with third parties, gives the
government the opportunity to access millions of points of data on nearly every citizen, without a
warrant, including the CSLI data at the center of the Carpenter case.
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V. Carpenter v. United States
The progression of Fourth Amendment cases in Kyllo, Jones, and Riley all lead up to
Carpenter v. United States, which was argued on November 19th, 2017. Carpenter presents the
Court with the opportunity to decide how all of its Fourth Amendment precedents and doctrines
discussed in this paper will be applied in the modern technology era. In Carpenter four men
were suspected of committing a series of armed robberies in April 2011. One of the four men
gave the FBI not only his cell phone number, but also the cell phone numbers of the other three
suspects. With this information the FBI sought three orders, to obtain the “transactional records”
of the alleged participants in the armed robberies.85 These orders, known as 2703(d) orders,
were granted under provision 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act,
That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain
telecommunications records when ‘specific and articulable facts show that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.’86
In Carpenter, the transactional records that were requested included not only the date and
time of calls, but also the location of the phone, and as a result the location of Mr. Carpenter,
based upon the cell phone’s distance from cell phone tower sites. This is where the Cell Site
Location Information (CSLI) occurs.87 Any time a cellphone automatically sends signals to a
cell tower, pings the tower, in order to retrieve new emails, text messages, or refresh a web
search, a new CSLI data point is created for that cell phone user. This pinging of cell site towers
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by an individuals cellphone in order to refresh applications and processes on a phone creates new
CSLI data points hundred if not thousands of times each day.
The private information available from cell phones is not limited to the data stored on the
phone itself. For a phone to receive and share much of that data—to be usable at all—it must
connect with a cell tower. Every time it does, it generates information, stored by the phone
company, about which tower the phone connected to— essentially where the phone was—on
a given date and time. These small bits of data—called cell site location information
(CSLI)—are aggregated by providers and, like GPS data, they ‘generate a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’88
In Carpenter the Government obtained 127 days of Mr. Carpenter’s CSLI data. The case
presents numerous issues for the Court to grapple with, and many different doctrines and
precedents to adapt to the reality of the modern digital age. It presents a true test of how the
Court will deal with the Fourth Amendment’s expectations of privacy and the third-party
doctrine in the era of ever growing-digital data and cell phone usage and capabilities.
A. Petitioner’s Brief in Carpenter v. United States
In the petitioner’s brief for Carpenter, the main argument is that CSLI should be covered
under the Katz test and receive the protection of requiring a warrant before the government can
obtain this information. In order to establish this point Carpenter puts forth three arguments, 1).
Showing that there is subjective expectation to privacy that society is ready to accept as
reasonable, 2). That the analogue era third-party doctrine, from Smith and Miller, does not apply
to this digital age, 3). Finally how under the Telecommunications Act § 222(c)(1)-(2), (h)(1)(A)
CSLI data is the property of the wireless customer, and therefore “papers” under the Fourth
Amendment in the digital age.
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1. Carpenter Has a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In order to show that the government conducted a search, without a warrant, and therefore
violated his Fourth Amendment rights, Carpenter must show that CSLI passes the Katz test from
Justice Harlan’s concurrence.
Under this Court’s longstanding test, government agents engage in a Fourth Amendment
search when they intrude on an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).89
The Katz framework was put into place, and must be applied to the technology available to the
government today, in order to “‘assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed’ prior to the advent of the new technology in question.”90 The prime example of this
is from the Katz case where the “Court held…that the Fourth Amendment applies to
conversations transmitted over telephone lines because phones played a ‘vital role’ in conducting
the type of communication previously treated as ‘private.’ 389 U.S. at 352-53.”91 Carpenter
argues that just like the GPS device use to track Mr. Jones’ every movement, CSLI does the
exact same thing, but on a more accurate, and detailed level.
Applying this framework in United States v. Jones, five Justices agreed that people have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses.’ Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)…Because GPS
monitoring of a car tracks ‘every movement’ a person makes in that vehicle, id. at 430 (Alito,
J., concurring in the judgment), it generates extremely sensitive and private information that
‘enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, [people’s] political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on,’ id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Prior to the digital
age, this information would have been largely immune from search. Although historically the
government could have tasked a team of agents with surreptitiously tailing a suspect, doing
so ‘for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.’
Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Therefore, ‘society’s expectation has been
that law enforcement agents and others would not— and indeed, in the main, simply could
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not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very
long period.’ Id. at 430.92
CSLI does the same thing as long-term GPS monitoring, but can give a law enforcement
individual an even more vivid depiction of the individual’s movements and associations during
the collection of CSLI data. Relying on the result in Jones, and the Katz test, Carpenter argues,
“These principles dictate that government agents conduct a search when they obtain longer-term
historical cell phone location records from a person’s cellular service provider.”93
Carpenter asserts that any ruling other than one that affords a reasonable expectation of
privacy in CSLI is inconsistent with Jones and with the principle laid down in Katz.
For the same reason that five Justices concluded that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in longer-term GPS monitoring of a car, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in longer-term cell phone location records. Any other conclusion would allow the
government to circumvent the principle accepted by five Justices in Jones through the simple
expedient of obtaining cell phone location records. People use their cell phones throughout
the day—when they are at home, work, or school, when they are in the car or on public
transportation, when they are shopping or eating, and when they are visiting the doctor, a
lawyer, a political associate, or a friend. People even keep their phones nearby and turned on
while they are asleep. Indeed, ‘nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within
five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones
in the shower.’ Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. ‘[D]etails about the location of a cell phone can
provide an intimate picture of one’s daily life.’ State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J.
2013)… And to state the obvious, when people make a ‘visit to a gynecologist, a psychiatrist,
a bookie, or a priest,’ they typically ‘assume that the visit is private.’ United States v. Davis,
754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (Sentelle, J.), rev’d en banc, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir.
2015).94
The type of detail and infallible computer generated data that the CSLI provides law enforcement
is far beyond anything the government has ever had the power to obtain.
Indeed, prior to the digital age, the only way for the government conceivably to have
obtained anything close to [CSLI]…would have been to ask the suspect to recall his past
movements and divulge them to police. But that exercise would be severely limited by the
vagaries of human memory and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self92
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incrimination… Accordingly, the power to ‘reconstruct someone’s specific movements down
to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building,’ … gives police
access to ‘a category of information that never would be available through the use of
traditional law enforcement tools of investigation.’95
Carpenter continues by again illustrating how the CSLI will only become more precise and
revealing as the number of cell sites increase, and as the cell phone technology becomes more
advanced. In order to preserve the expectation of privacy adopted by the framers about a
person’s location history and whereabouts, Carpenter concludes that the only thing the Court can
do is bring the Katz test into the twenty-first century and protect citizens from unlimited
government access to their CSLI. “Drawing a line that protects against collection of longer-term
location records is crucial to preserving the privacy that Americans enjoyed from the Framing to
the dawn of the digital age.”96
2. The Analogue Third-Party Doctrine is not Applicable in the Digital Era
The second prong of Carpenter’s case is to show that the decisions of Smith and Miller upon
which the Sixth Circuit based its decision are incorrect. Carpenter believes that this approach is
incorrect, and incompatible with CSLI in two major ways.
The Sixth Circuit believed that two cases from the pre-digital age—Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979), and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)—constituted ‘binding
precedent’ precluding application of the Fourth Amendment to the records at issue. Pet. App.
12a-14a; see also BIO 14. They do not. There is no basis in this Court’s jurisprudence for
extending Smith and Miller to CSLI, both because the information is more sensitive, and
because it is not voluntarily shared with a third party in any meaningful way.97
Not only does Carpenter believe that Smith and Miller are not workable in the digital age, the
lawyer who argued and won for Maryland, in Smith v. Maryland, believes that the third-party
doctrine should not apply to the modern digital era, especially to CSLI.
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The facts in Carpenter are markedly different — and so is the technology…A majority of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that the phone-based logic of Smith was also
applicable to cell-tower communications and affirmed Carpenter’s convictions...This is
taking the Smith precedent way too far, in a vastly different technological age. When the
Supreme Court decided Smith, in the pre-dawn of the digital age…no one involved in the
case could foresee the digital revolution that was to come.98
Carpenter is not asking for the Court to overturn Smith and Miller. Instead, Carpenter is asking
the Court to distinguish these decisions by virtue of the nature of the information available to the
police in the digital age.
This Court need not disturb the holdings of Smith and Miller to conclude that they do not
apply in this context. The particular records at issue here are far more sensitive and personal
than those in Smith and Miller, and are not conveyed in a meaningfully voluntary way.
Indeed, the typical user is not even aware that the cellular service provider has this
compendium of sensitive information.99
3. CSLI Data is Considered the “Papers” of the Cellular Customer
The final element of Carpenter’s argument is found in a provision of the Telecommunication
Act, specifically § 222(c)(1)-(2), (h)(1)(A). This provision,
[d]esignates cell phone location information as “customer proprietary network information”
(“CPNI”)—a category of records that the service provider cannot disclose absent “approval
of the customer.” 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1)-(2), (h)(1)(A). As the Federal Communications
Commission explains, location information “clearly qualifies as CPNI,” and therefore
subjects service providers to “a duty to protect [its] confidentiality.”100
As a result of this, and the intent behind the act to clearly include location data, Mr. Carpenter’s
CSLI data would clearly become his “papers,” which are explicitly stated as being protected
under the Fourth Amendment. “The proprietary interest created by statute makes clear that CSLI
is the “paper”—of the customer. ‘[T]o the extent CPNI is property, . . . it is better understood as
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belonging to the customer, not the carrier.’”101 Carpenter concludes that his aim is not to have
Smith and Miller and the third-party doctrine overturned, but instead find a necessary and
appropriate balance between privacy and police powers,
In sum, clarifying that a warrant is required will ensure that law enforcement officers can
acquire particular spans of location records where there is probable cause that they will
provide evidence of criminal conduct. And it will protect records that are not pertinent to the
investigation but that can reveal much private information about a person’s life. This Court
should provide a ‘simple’ answer to the question presented: ‘get a warrant.’ Riley, 134 S. Ct.
at 2495.102
B. Brief for the Respondent
The government’s position in Carpenter was succinctly summarized in the oral argument of
the case, where Mr. Dreeben, speaking for the government said,
The technology here is new, but the legal principles that this Court has articulated under the
Fourth Amendment are not… They [the cell phone companies] choose to make their own
business records… They make decisions based on their business needs about what there
going to retain. And when the government comes and asks them to produce it, it is doing the
same thing that it did in Smith. It is doing the same thing that it did in Miller. It is asking a
business to provide information about the business’s own transactions with a customer. And
under the third-party doctrine, that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment rights of the
customer.103
In its brief the United States attempts to refute the claim that obtaining the CSLI information of
an individual from a wireless carrier is a search under the Fourth Amendment. It is not a search
because the third-party doctrine created in Smith and Miller gave the government the right to
obtain information from a third party, and it would not be considered a search. “In its decisions
in Miller and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), this Court further concluded that the
acquisition of a business’s records does not constitute a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ of an
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individual customer even when the records reflect information pertaining to that customer.”104
Even though the technology of CSLI and cellphones is new, the United States is arguing that the
Court should decide the case under the same precedents that have been in place for nearly four
decades. “The principles set forth in Miller and Smith resolve this case.”105 Specifically, one of
the main principles from Smith and Miller that should carry through and apply to this case is
articulated below:
Any subjective expectation of privacy in information transmitted to a cellular-service
provider by engaging its cellular network would not be objectively reasonable because ‘a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.’ Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-744… a cell-phone user must reveal his general
location to a cell tower in order for the cellular service provider to connect a call. And a cell
phone user thus ‘takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to [the cellular-service provider], that
the information’ he transmits in engaging the cellular network ‘will be conveyed by [the
cellular-service provider] to the Government.’ Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. Because petitioner
‘voluntarily conveyed to [his cellular-service providers] information that [they] had facilities
for recording and that [they] w[ere] free to record,’ he ‘assumed the risk that the information
would be divulged to police.’ Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.106
Under this line of thinking, the government concluded that the Sixth Circuit “correctly concluded
that the government’s acquisition of the historical cell-site data did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.”107 The United States recognizes that there is new technology present in
this case, and that Carpenter utilizes Jones and Riley to make his argument. However the United
States attempts to distinguish these two cases from Carpenter, noting they only relate to
Carpenter because of their use of new technology, not because of their relation to the third-party
doctrine and its applicability to the modern digital age.
Petitioner suggests (Pet. 16-18, 27-28) that the Fourth Amendment principles recognized in
Smith and Miller should not apply to new technologies. Although petitioner relies (Pet. 16104
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18) on Jones and Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), those decisions did not
address—much less disavow—this Court’s precedents recognizing that an individual does
not have a Fourth Amendment interest in a third party’s records pertaining to him or in
information that he voluntarily conveys to third parties.108
The brief also addresses Carpenter’s claim that having a cell-phone and creating CSLI is not
voluntary at the modern day and age. The government’s brief contends that,
Petitioner chose to carry a cell phone for the purpose of having his wireless provider route
calls to and from him whenever he was in range of a cell tower. By ‘expect[ing] his phone to
work,’ he ‘permitt[ed]—indeed, request[ed]—his service provider to establish a connection
between his phone and a nearby cell tower,’ and he thus ‘voluntarily convey[ed] the
information necessary for his service provider to identify the [historical cell-site data] for his
calls.’109
Since people understand that in order for their phone to send and receive calls, emails, text
messages, and use the internet, the phone must connect to the carrier’s cell towers and receive a
cell signal, they are properly viewed as voluntarily conveying this information to the cell phone
company, a third party. In addition, the United States argues for the continuing applicability of
the third-party doctrine, and it also rejects that the sensitivity and intimacy of the information
CSLI can reveal about a person garners any legal standing or precedent case law.
Petitioner also errs in suggesting (Pet. 29) that Smith and Miller are inapplicable because the
records at issue in this case are ‘exceedingly sensitive and private in ways that were not at
issue in [those decisions].’ Petitioner provides no support for his contention that records of
the cell towers to which a phone connected when placing or receiving a call are more private
than, for example, the financial information contained in the ‘checks, deposit slips, * * *
financial statements, and * * * monthly statements’ the government acquired in Miller. 425
U.S. at 438… That analysis applies with even greater force here because, unlike in Miller,
the records at issue here are not even copies of documents that petitioner submitted to the
cellular-service providers, and the government did not require the providers to keep those
records. See ibid. Petitioner’s argument also overlooks the ‘core distinction’ between ‘the
content of personal communications’ and ‘the information necessary to get those
communications from point A to point B.’ ‘The business records here fall on the unprotected
side of this line’ because they ‘say nothing about the content of any calls’ but instead contain
only ‘routing information.’110
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Finally, the United States seeks to apply a balancing test for the Fourth Amendment. Under
this argument, even were the Court, incorrectly, to grant privacy protection to the CSLI records
of Mr. Carpenter, the government still would have committed a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.
“As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality
of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’’’ Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969
(2013) (citation omitted). A “warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all
government searches; and when a warrant is not required (and the Warrant Clause there- fore
not applicable), probable cause is not invariably required either.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).111
When Fourth Amendment cases arise which do not possess much if any guidance from the
framers about the reasonableness of warrantless search the Court usually proceeds, “[b]y
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon the individual’s privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interest.”112
Under traditional Fourth Amendment standards, petitioner had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the third-party business records at issue here. But even if this Court were to depart
from that settled framework and hold that an individual can assert a Fourth Amendment
interest in records created by a third party… petitioner could at most assert only a diminished
expectation of privacy in those records. That is a factor that this Court has said ‘may render a
warrantless search or seizure reasonable.’... And any invasion of petitioner’s assumed
privacy interest was minimal, given the imprecise nature of the location information that
could be inferred from the historical cell-site records at issue here… On the other side of the
reasonableness balance, the government has a compelling interest… like other investigative
techniques that involve seeking information from third parties about a crime, this evidence is
‘particularly valuable during the early stages of an investigation, when the police [may] lack
probable cause and are confronted with multiple suspects… Society has a strong interest in
both promptly apprehending criminals and exonerating innocent suspects as early as possible
during an investigation.113
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VI. Are the Courts the Correct Branch to Resolve this Issue?
The case presented by both sides of Carpenter v. United States relies heavily on affirming,
distinguishing, or refuting long-standing and recently decided cases issued by the Court. Both
sides make compelling arguments about why the Court should decide this case in their favor;
however, these are not the only two parties who are considering this important issue at the
moment. As has been noted, some justices and legal scholars are not sure if the courts are the
correct vehicle for deciding privacy of third-party records in the modern digital age. Many
believe that it should be up to legislatures to conduct research and find out what Americans truly
believe should be protected by privacy claims and what should not. The next chapter will focus
on the legislative history of electronic privacy, mainly at the federal level, and will take a look at
some of the proposals that are being considered by Congress in order to give adequate privacy
protections to citizens in the modern technology age.
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Chapter 3: Legislation and the Third-Party Doctrine
Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will gradually erode as
technology advances. Congress must act to protect the privacy of our citizens.114
There is no doubt among the Supreme Court Justices that times have changed, and the digital
era requires updated privacy protections from the analogue generation; however, among the
Justices it is not clear how this should be accomplished, or even which branch of government is
best suited to provide a solution to this complex and constantly-evolving issue. Justice Alito in
his concurring opinion in United States v. Jones recognized that there many important issues
presented by the clash of modern technologies and the Fourth Amendment. It is his position that
the issues should not be resolved first by the Supreme Court, but rather that the legislature must
perform the necessary research, in order to arrive at the required solution to this problem.
Justice Alito is not the only critic of today’s reliance upon the Court to resolve these thorny
privacy matters. Many Fourth Amendment scholars believe that Alito’s call for a legislative
solution is correct. On the other side of this issue, Justice Sotomayor made it clear in her
separate concurring opinion in Jones that it was time for the Court to reconsider its jurisprudence
concerning the Fourth Amendment and its interaction with modern technology. Justice
Sotomayor believes that it is up to the Court to reconsider the third-party doctrine and other
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and its applicability to cases involving technology. Her
position is that the Court must reengineer its analogue jurisprudence to adapt to the modern
digital era first before Congress should attempt to address the inequality between police power

114

Daniel T. Pesciotta, “I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st
Century,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 63 no. 1, (2012): 251,
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=119
6&context=caselrev.

53
and citizen privacy. The change and adaptation of the Court’s precedents to modern times needs
to come from the nine members of the Court and not the elected representatives in Congress.
I. History of Congressional Electronic Privacy Statutes
The previous chapters explained how the Court has arrived at its current case, Carpenter v.
United States, and the potential privacy implications it presents. However, to understand all of
the implications of this case one must understand the congressional legislation they produced
that coincide with the Court decisions. This chapter will focus on the congressional legislation
that has been enacted, from the analogue protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) to the many updates and amendments to the ECPA, such as the Telecommunication
Act of 1996. The chapter will also discuss the competing arguments about whether the Court or
Congress can best resolve the issue. The positions of both legal scholars and Justices Alito and
Sotomayor will be carefully analyzed.
Before turning to this discussion relevant congressional legislation will be considered. The
first Act of Congress that must be understood is the combined Electronic Communications
Privacy Act115 and the Stored Communications Act,116 which are commonly grouped together as
the ECPA. The ECPA was passed in 1986, and was an update of the 1968 Federal Wiretap
Act.117 The Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 dealt with intercepted conversations that occurred
using “hard” telephone lines. The updated ECPA was Congress’ first attempt to provide
protections not only for wire and oral conversations, but also for new (at the time) electronic
communications such as email and stored electronic data. Congress understood in 1986 that
there needed to be greater privacy protections for citizens than just from “hard” communications
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via the telephone. Changing technology dictated to Congress that there needed to be changes to
the privacy protections citizens had, but at the same time the protections could not be so allencompassing that they would hinder the ability of law enforcement officers to use the new
technology to do their jobs in the most effective manner possible. “By enacting ECPA, Congress
weighed different public interests. The House report noted that the ECPA measure ‘represents a
fair balance between the privacy expectations of citizens and the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.’”118
The ECPA represents an extremely challenging issue for Congress, and one that has only
become harder as technology has become more and more advanced. On the one hand, Congress
must grant citizens their required expectation of privacy that was laid out in the Katz test. On the
other hand, Congress must give law enforcement the procedures and tools that will allow them to
do their jobs in the most efficient and proper way possible. When the only way to communicate
with people was through written messages, telephone communications, and face-to-face
conversations, the Wiretap Act of 1968 was perfectly suited for that analogue era of technology.
Now with new forms of technology appearing seemingly daily, and new platforms for
communication being utilized every hour, it is clear that the Wiretap Act of 1968 is no longer
sufficient. Consequently, the original ECPA of 1986 must be constantly reviewed and amended
to suit modern times. However, questions remain regarding how should Congress update the
ECPA to make sure it will pass the balancing test laid out above. Another question is whether
Congress is the most appropriate governmental branch to maintain the constantly changing
equilibrium between privacy and police power in the digital age?
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A. Title I of the ECPA
The ECPA is broken up into three distinct sections, referred to as “Titles.” Title I is most
commonly known as the Wiretap Act, and--is the amended as of 1986 version--of the Wiretap
Act of 1968. Title I “prohibits the intentional actual or attempted interception, use, disclosure, or
‘procure[ment] [of] any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept and wire, oral, or
electronic communication,’”119 except when a proper order from a magistrate has been given to
law enforcement. Title I does not say that a warrant, backed by probable cause, is required to
obtain this information. Rather, it stipulates that a court order from a judge must be obtained in
order for this information to be obtained or attempted to be obtained. Here Congress is seeking
to prevent law enforcement from going on a “witch hunt” and surveying all calls and
conversations made by each individual. Instead, Congress is simply requiring law enforcement
officers to have sufficient evidence to convince a judge that compromising the privacy of a
certain citizen or citizens is likely to yield evidence of criminal activity. This balances the need
of law enforcement to obtain this information with the citizen’s privacy interest by having the
protection of a third-party magistrate, who ensures that the law enforcement officers are looking
with some degree of likelihood of finding evidence. Although a warrant backed by probable
cause is not required by Title I of the ECPA, Congress still requires that a judge approve the
information and order.
B. Title II of the ECPA
Title II of the ECPA is called the Stored Communications Act (SCA). Title II “protects the
privacy of the contents of files stored by service providers and of records held about the
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subscriber by service providers, such as subscriber name, billings records, or IP addresses.”120 It
is not limited to information such as a subscriber’s name, billing records, or IP addresses, and it
covers issues such as Cell Site Location Information (CSLI), and the thousands of data points
that come from that form of data stored by a third party. This type of CSLI data, obtained by the
government with a 2703(d) order, is the data in question in the Carpenter case. Just as with Title
I of the ECPA, the government must obtain a magistrate’s order, but is not required to obtain a
warrant backed by probable cause, to be able to obtain stored records that fall under the purview
of the SCA. Again, this plays into the balancing test that Congress required when considering
the privacy of citizens, and the ability of law enforcement to effectively do their jobs. The
absence of a warrant requirement is one of the main issues that the Court will have to either
address themselves or hold appropriate for a legislative solution.
The SCA is becoming increasingly crucial as a result of the massive and constantly growing
amounts of information third parties such as cellphone providers, television providers, internet
search engines, and social media websites maintain and store about each individual’s
preferences, browsing and user history. All of this information is available to the government,
without a warrant backed by probable cause what is required is to merely show a judge there is
enough reasonable suspicion for a subpoena. Nearly every person gives information to a third
party in some capacity in the digital age. That information is then being stored and used by
companies in ways never before possible. This depth of information, such as the 127 days of
CSLI data in Carpenter that can be obtained by the government without a warrant, brings into
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question the balance between citizen’s privacy and the ability of law enforcement to do their jobs
under the ECPA.
C. Title III of the ECPA
Title III of the ECPA was created to address the issue of “pen registers,” like the one used in
Smith v. Maryland, and tap and trace devices. This last Title of the ECPA “requires government
entities to obtain a court order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register… and/or a
trap and trace… The order can be issued on the basis of certification by the applicant that the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”121 This part
of the ECPA clearly shows how the legislature can play a critical role in solving this problem of
technology in the digital era, especially when data and information is given to third parties in an
involuntary manner, required by society. Title III was enacted as part of the ECPA as a direct
result of Congress’ disagreement with the decision in Smith. The objective was to mandate
additional protections when it comes the government’s use of trap trace devices, and more
specifically pen registers.
For example, in response to Smith, Congress enacted the Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Devices Statute… However, the Pen Register statute makes it a crime to install a pen register
without a court order, subject to some exceptions. Obtaining a court order is quite easy under
the statute: Investigators need only certify that ‘the information likely to be obtained ... is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.' But this still imposes a good faith test: The
law requires an actual ongoing investigation and a good faith belief in the likelihood that
evidence to be obtained is relevant to that investigation.122
II. Statutory Response to Smith and Miller
This legislative response to the Smith decision, which held that individuals had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information given to third parties—specifically the phone numbers they
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dialed—was one that does not place a significant burden on law enforcement to obtain the
information. Meanwhile Congress put in a reasonable safeguard to ensure that law enforcement
was not simply fishing in random people’s phone records. The ECPA, and more specifically
Title III, are not the only measures that Congress has taken to ensure that people have more
protections in private information they give to a third party.
Congress also enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) in response to the Miller
case. In Miller the Court held that once financial information or any information had been given
to a third party such as a bank, the customer or individual lost all expectations to privacy, and all
privacy protections. Congress limited the scope of the Miller decision when it passed the RFPA.
RFPA responds to Miller by limiting government access to ‘the information contained in the
financial records of any customer from a financial institution' where the Fourth Amendment,
thanks to Miller, does not. Under RFPA, the government can obtain such financial records
with a subpoena only if the government has ‘reason to believe that the records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry’ and the government first provides the
suspect with prior notice of the planned action that gives him an opportunity to move to
quash the subpoena.123
Congressional response to Miller provides citizens with a stronger privacy protection in their
financial information than in their phone numbers they have dialed. With respect to phone
numbers, all the government must do is have a court issue an order that is backed by the
likelihood that the information obtained will lead to evidence of crime. In the case of financial
information held by a third-party, under the RFPA, the government not only must get a
subpoena, but also must notify the individual that they are attempting to obtain the subpoena.
This allows the individual time to file a motion to quash the subpoena before the records
demanded by the order are ever handed over to the government. While both of these responses
to the third-party doctrine’s foundation cases are strong indicators that Congress is capable of
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vehicle for solving the issue of third-party information and law enforcement’s access to it in the
digital age, neither of these acts provide that the government must satisfy the higher standard
required for a warrant before obtaining third party information.
III. Additional Statutory Exceptions to the Third-Party Doctrine
Congress has not only enacted statutory privacy protections for citizens’ information given to
third parties (in the case of phone numbers dialed or financial transactions); it has also enacted
many other restrictions on the government attempting to collect certain types of information
from specific third party information collectors and holders.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA”) protects medical
records; the Privacy Protection Act restricts government access to third-party records held by
newsgathering organizations; the Video Privacy Protection Act provides special privacy
protections for video rental records; the Stored Communications Act restricts access to email
account records; and the Cable Act restricts access to cable account records. These laws all
impose statutory restrictions on access to records that the third-party doctrine leaves
unprotected under the Fourth Amendment.124
These are just a few of the examples where Congress has intervened legislatively and has raised
the privacy bar from unfettered government access to information voluntarily given to a third
party, to that of requiring a Court order or subpoena. Although most of the time these statutes
grant less privacy protections than a probable cause warrant required in other Fourth Amendment
cases, they still establish a higher privacy standard for individuals and their information given to
certain third parties than is required by the third-party doctrine.125 Many scholars agree with
Justice Alito that the legislature should decide, with statutes, on the privacy expectations of
society when it comes to the technology era and the third-party doctrine.
One of these scholars is Orin Kerr who believes, like Justice Alito, that these statutory
protections granted to citizens offer a strong remedy for the current issues presented by third124
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party information in the technology age. Kerr also believes that the fact that most of these
provisions provide for less privacy protection than a probable cause warrant. While at the same
time maintaining an appropriate balance that Congress and or the Court must find, between an
individual’s expectation of privacy in the digital age, and the restrictions to place on law
enforcement trying to do their jobs as effectively as possible in the technology era. Kerr says,
In many (but not all) of these cases, the statutory privacy laws provide less protection
than would the analogous Fourth Amendment standard of a probable cause warrant. But
that is a good thing rather than a bad one. The fact that standards are low prevents the
end-run around the balance of Fourth Amendment rules that outsourcing can permit. At
the same time, the standards are substantial enough to make it quite unlikely that the
police would use the investigative powers solely to harass innocent suspects. In the case
of financial records, a suspect could move to quash the subpoena, which would provide a
court audience to hear his complaint of government overreaching. And in the case of pen
registers, the government must first go to a judge and seek an order, certifying under
oath that an ongoing investigation exists and that the information collected is likely to be
relevant. These intermediate standards deter wrongful abuse while permitting legitimate
investigations. They strike a middle ground not possible under the Fourth
Amendment.126
In other words, Fourth Amendment case law could not achieve the required delicate balance as
effectively as the statutory protections Congress is able to prescribe. The required middle
ground can be reached, between the third-party doctrine giving the government free reign and
unrestricted access to all third parties records, and a probable cause warrant as prescribed by the
Fourth Amendment placing a substantial burden of proof on law enforcement trying to gather
and obtain evidence for a case. This middle ground, according to Kerr, can be found by statutory
protections and regulations implemented by Congress as new technology develops.
IV. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The final piece of legislation that plays a role in the Carpenter case, and in the future of
third-party doctrine, is the Telecommunication Act of 1996. The original Telecommunications
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Act was passed in 1934. As can readily be imagined, it is not adequate either in terms of the
privacy protections it provides or technology and scope of the laws it covered. The 1996
Telecommunications Act did not have as its primary purpose the updating of privacy protections
for individuals or the third-party doctrine and its application to modern technology and society.
Instead, its intent was “to let anyone enter any communications business—to let any
communications business compete in any market against any other.”127 The Act, however, has
two sections that could play a crucial role in the decision in the Carpenter case, and how
Congress will deal with the evolution of technology and privacy law in the coming years. The
two sections, 47 U.S.C. §§ 222(c)(1)-(2) and (f), provide that information given to a
telecommunications company such as an internet, cellphone, or television provider, is proprietary
to the customer, and will require the explicit consent of the customer before it can be given to
anyone, including the government.128 This may seem as though there is no question left by
section 222 that the information belongs to the customer to decide who may have it, when they
may have it, and how much information they may have. In fact, the sections comes with a caveat
which says, “Except as required by law,….”129 This exception is the crux of the
Telecommunications Act argument in Carpenter. As it stands now, the 2703(d) Order used by
the government to require cell phone companies to turn over certain types of information,
including CSLI data, is required by law. This is being challenged by Mr. Carpenter, who argues
that section 222 means that information such as CSLI data, which is collected by cell phone
carriers, is in fact his personal property and therefore is part of his private papers. As a result of
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this property-based approach, the same approach used by the majorities in Olmstead and Jones,
the information protected by sections 222 of the Telecommunications Act is the papers of the
customer. Therefore these records are subject to Fourth Amendment protections, meaning a
warrant backed by probable cause is required, regardless of what the reasonable expectations of
privacy analysis would dictate. And even more importantly, since the information is property
belonging to the customer and is not simply information given to a third party, the third-party
doctrine is not relevant and cannot be used.
In addition, obtaining CSLI records invades an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to
security in his private ‘papers.’ Federal law grants individuals a proprietary interest in their
CSLI records by prohibiting service providers from disclosing that information without
‘express prior authorization of the customer.’ 47 U.S.C. § 222(f). Wholly apart from the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis, the government’s impingement on that interest
for the purposes of gather-information constitutes a search.130
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 adds an entirely new concept into the mix of the
Carpenter case, because it is addition by subtraction. As a result of removing ownership of the
CSLI data from the cell phone carrier, and giving it back to the customer, the third-party doctrine
and the entirety of the government’s argument that the case should be decided on the same
grounds as Smith and Miller becomes moot and no longer relevant. Whether only Justice
Gorsuch is interested in this argument offered by Carpenter remains to be seen, but this small
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 could play a huge role in swinging how the Court
votes on the important third-party doctrine case Carpenter. This property-based approach that is
employed by originalists such as Justices Gorsuch and Thomas could provide two additional
votes in favor of Mr. Carpenter. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Mr. Carpenter appears
to have a majority of the Court willing to rule in his favor, but for many different reasons.
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Of course, Congress has enacted additional legislation that has raised or lowered the privacy
standard for different types of law enforcement requests, but the ECPA of 1986 and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 are the major pieces of legislation not only in Carpenter, but
also in the larger future of identifying that critical balance between a citizen’s expectations of
privacy and the needs of law enforcement. Whether or not these acts are sufficient to solve the
problems presented by technology in the digital era, and more specifically the questions that
technology raises regarding the third-party doctrine, has been hotly debated among scholars.
Opponents of the view espoused by Professor Kerr believe that it is up to the Court to resolve
these issues. He argues that because the Court created the third-party doctrine, and since
Congress does not currently seem to able to pass legislation, the Court must be proactive and
take cases that will help settle this issue as quickly as possible. Some theories also include the
Court taking cues from the legislation passed by Congress in order to better reflect the
expectations of society as a whole when it comes to privacy in the digital era. The following part
of the chapter will discuss the reasons why scholars believe that the Court alone, or Congress
alone, or some amalgamation of the two decide what to do about privacy standards, and more
specifically the third-party doctrine, in the current technology era.
V. Legal Scholars’ Support for a Legislative Solution
Professor Kerr is one of the only scholars who champions the third-party doctrine in the
digital age, and he supports a legislative solution. Kerr believes that the legislature is best
equipped to handle the constant change in technology and the scope of the privacy protections
that should be given to citizens, and the restrictions that should be placed on law enforcement’s
use of the new technology. “Enthusiasm for judicial solutions overlooks significant institutional
limitations of judicial rulemaking. Courts tend to be poorly suited to generate effective rules
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regulating criminal investigations involving new technologies. In contrast, legislatures possess
significant institutional advantages in this area over courts.”131 Kerr argues that legislation is the
best option when it comes to being able to adapt, research, and produce the most balanced and
thorough approach to the privacy issues raised by new technology, and its intersection with
analogue precedents such as the third-party doctrine. The differences between the capabilities of
the legislature and of the courts inform Orin Kerr’s belief that Congress is the appropriate arbiter
of the clash between the new technology and individual privacy rights. However, other scholars
such as Charles Maclean, agree with Kerr that in the modern technology age Congress is the
more appropriate vehicle to settle this dispute, but present a distinct rationale.
In his article, “Katz on a Hot Tin Roof,” Maclean lays out why he believes that in an era of
constant technological change the legislature is the best vehicle to reset the privacy bar to the
appropriate height. While he acknowledges that the Court played a critical and positive role in
the analogue era, he believes that the pace of technological change makes the Court less able to
respond than Congress.
When technological change moved glacially before the digital age, it was sufficient for courts
to serve as the line of defense for privacy rights. But in the digital age, technological
advancement moves like the hare, and courts move like the tortoise, so we must now look to
legislature, and particular Congress, to reset the privacy bar.132
Maclean harkens back to Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead, in which he pointed to
“an ongoing need for such Congressional interventions lest technology diminish privacy to the
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vanishing point.”133 He continues by using the ECPA as an example of congressional
recognition of the need to update the Act from 1986 and bring it into the twenty-first century.
The ECPA of 1986 has been unable to provide the necessary protections for the unforeseen shift
in the foundation of society created by the exponential expansion of the use and capabilities of
the internet. As a result, Congress saw the need to update the Act in order for it to maintain the
critical balance between citizen’s privacy and law enforcement powers. “By 2000, Congress had
witnessed more technological revolution, necessitating, in its view, the ECPA, adding electronic
communications to the oral and wire communications addressed in Title III, among other
changes necessitated predominantly by the Internet explosion.”134 This demonstrates that
Congress is capable of drawing the necessary lines, at the required times, to facilitate the proper
privacy protections for people, while the Court is only able to set the minimum standard of
acceptable privacy protections for citizens. “Courts can set, perhaps, the absolute floor as
constitutionally required, but Congress must decide where, above that floor, the privacy line
must be drawn.”135 Maclean continues with his ECPA example by demonstrating how Congress
updated the protections due to changes in society’s use of technology in 2013, verses its use of
technology in 2000,
Congressional intervention continued, as exemplified in the 2013 amendments to the ECPA.
Congress expressed the need for additional safeguards in the digital age:
The Committee recognizes that most Americans regularly use email in their professional
and personal lives for confidential communications of a business or personal nature. The
Committee also recognizes that there is growing uncertainty about the constitutionality of
the provisions in ECPA that allow the Government to obtain certain email content
without a search warrant. The absence of a clear legal standard for access to electronic
communications content not only endangers privacy rights, but also endangers the
admissibility of evidence in criminal and other legal proceedings. Accordingly, the
Committee has determined that the law must be updated to keep pace with the advances
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in technology in order to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment
protections for email and other electronic communications content.136
Maclean then lays out why the institutional limits on the Court, such as having to look back at
precedent, while Congress can look forward to solve issues presented by current technology,
makes Congress the correct body in order to solve these issues.
Left to their own devices, courts are compelled to look back at precedent to resolve the
disputes of tomorrow. Congress, on the other hand, looks forward to reset the privacy bar in
the digital age. The paradigm is set; society must look to Congress to redefine what should
and shall be private in the future, rather than waiting for courts to force-fit new technologies
into outmoded precedential analogies.137
Although his reasons are different, Maclean fundamentally agrees with Kerr that Congress is the
correct arbiter of privacy protections and law enforcement restrictions when it comes to
technology, and obtaining data from a third party in the digital era.
The amount of information now stored with third party Internet companies have produced a
qualitative change in the nature of communications and, accordingly, in the nature and
amount of the information that may be exposed to interception by the government. In light
of these developments, existing statutes should be updated to appropriately balance the
concerns of law enforcement—namely, the concern that they have sufficient authority to
obtain the information they need in order to keep the public safe—with individuals’ concerns
that a sufficient degree of privacy and the integrity of personal information are maintained in
an age of modern communications and information storage.138
Justice Alito, along with many scholars, shares the position that Congress is the correct
institution to remedy the wrongs of current privacy law. In addition, Alito believes that
Congress can best set standards for electronic privacy, including data collected and given to third
parties in the future. Justice Alito in Jones understood and acknowledged that technological
innovation has dictated that change to privacy laws must be made, but he said that Congress was
the branch of government that had to do this.
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VI. Legal Scholars’ Support for a Judicial Solution
Although she sided with the other eight members of the Court in Jones, Justice Sotomayor
believes that the Court has to be the governmental branch that begins solving the issues that
technology raises in terms of citizen privacy and law enforcement efficiency. In her concurring
opinion, she argues,
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties…I for
one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.
But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only
if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for
privacy.139
Legal scholar Paul Ohm, believes that in order for the issue of technology and privacy to be
solved, the Court must reshape the way in which it thinks about Fourth Amendment cases.
Ohm’s belief is based upon the fact that privacy is diminishing, if not dying, within society, and,
as a result, the Court must switch thinking about the Fourth Amendment from the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test to the balance of power between police power and
individual’s privacy interests. “The end of privacy disrupts the rules we use to give action to the
amendment, and we must shift away from Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy to rules that
focus instead on the balance of power between the police and the people.”140 Achieving this
equilibrium between police power and citizen privacy can only be accomplished through
changing the way the Court approaches Fourth Amendment precedents and future cases. Ohm
believes that the effective utilization of warrants based upon probable cause is an aspect of the
equilibrium adjustment equation; however, it is by no means a solid solution that will keep the
precarious balance between police power and citizen privacy stable. He contends,
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Equilibrium adjustment can help judges determine whether to turn the Fourth Amendment’s
tuning knobs to restore the level playing field. But it will not do enough to safeguard liberty
from undue governmental power unless we also add a few new tuning knobs. A new Fourth
Amendment designed to enforce the level playing field must address the misconception that
the warrant and probable cause requirements represent the high water mark, the most onerous
and liberty-protective things that may be imposed on the government. The very development
that brought us to this point, the rise of the surveillance society, instead reveals that the
warrant and probable cause requirements are often quite toothless requirements that the
government will be able to meet with ease.141
According to Ohm, the equilibrium that has to be achieved in the modern digital era will
require the Court to reconstruct the foundation upon which privacy protection is built. The
analogue precedents that the Court relies upon, such as Katz, Smith, and Miller, are neither
compatible with modern technology, nor are they the foundation of Fourth Amendment
protections. The Fourth Amendment must be given an upgrade, a modernization, and this
requires laying a new foundation upon which technology and privacy can be kept in equilibrium.
The Court must balance police power and citizen privacy by establishing this new foundation on
new footings, not based on analogue era precedents of reasonable expectations of privacy, or
whether information has been given to a third-party.
For nearly fifty years, privacy has served as a useful proxy for deciding what the Fourth
Amendment protects. As we witness the rapid decline of privacy, we should be prepared to
rebuild the Fourth Amendment on a new foundation focused on the balance of power
between the state and its citizens.142
VII. Additional Arguments for a Judicial Solution
There are two remaining arguments that favor the Court taking control of this issue and
making sure that citizens have adequate privacy protections while still allowing the law
enforcement officers to do their job to the best of their ability. The first argument is that the past
decade Congress has become increasingly polarized, and as a result has become less productive
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and able to reach much needed compromise on nearly every issue. This lack of productivity
comes at a critical time when more and more aspects of individuals’ lives are online in the form
of shopping, social interactions, and work. And in many of these aspects of their lives they have
no choice but to interact with, rely upon, and give information to a third party. All of this
information is going to third parties and can be accessed by the government without a warrant.
Congress has not stepped in to address this issue because they cannot compromise and find the
right balance. Congress’ inability to do their job has left people more exposed and vulnerable to
abuses of law enforcement power through their information stored by third parties.
Given Congress’ recent lack of productivity, it seems unlikely that the legislative branch will
step in to reshape the third party exception any time soon. At the same time, consumers are
doing an increasing amount of business online, making more information available to third
parties than ever before. Particularly as companies and individuals increasingly turn to cloud
computing, putting even more information into the hands of third parties, the judiciary should
revisit the third party exception sooner rather than later.143
The second part of the argument is that, even if Congress were able to pass legislation
dealing with the third-party doctrine or new technology and privacy concerns, it would not be
all-encompassing. This inability to reform this statutory area with any meaningful and fully
comprehensive laws and procedures not only leaves citizens’ privacy unprotected, but also forces
the Court to use the Fourth Amendment as both a constitutional measure and as a privacy
safeguard to ensure the equilibrium is achieved and maintained. This part of the argument does
not view the Court as the ideal vehicle to solve this problem; rather it views the Court and the
Fourth Amendment as the only current way any change and protections will be added as a result
of constant congressional stalemate.
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In an ideal world, government information gathering would be regulated by a comprehensive
statutory regime. Courts would analyze whether the rules in this statutory regime met basic
Fourth Amendment principles rather than craft the rules themselves. A pronouncement as
short and vague as the Fourth Amendment best serves as a guidepost to evaluate rules, rather
than as a source of those rules. But a comprehensive statutory regime to regulate government
information gathering does not yet exist. Statutes regulate government information gathering
in isolated areas, but there is no all-inclusive regime. For better or worse, the Fourth
Amendment has been thrust into the role of the primary regulatory system of government
information gathering. Until there is a substitute, we should treat the Fourth Amendment as
the regulatory system it has been tasked with being. If legislatures respond with rules of their
own, courts should shift from crafting the rules to evaluating the rules made by
legislatures.144
The legislative history of technology and privacy reveals that Congress reacts to the changes
in society far too late, and not nearly often enough in order to provide the proper privacy
protections for citizens, while at the same time balancing the ability of the police to do their jobs
as effectively as possible. The final chapter will show how privacy doctrine in this area has
evolved from the law review article written by Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis, to the thirdparty doctrine cases of Smith and Miller, the ECPA, and the modern technology cases of Riley
and Jones, culminating in Carpenter v. United States. This case should demonstrate how the
Court is going to handle the issues of not only new technology and privacy rights, but also how
the Court is going to apply the third-party doctrine in the digital age. The solution must make
sure that law enforcement has the tools needed to do their jobs, but at the same time grant
citizens the required digital protections, not subject them to analogue doctrines, in a digital age.
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Chapter 4: Carpenter Oral Argument Analysis and Opinion Predictions
The Court remains the interpreter of the Fourth Amendment in our modern age. The
government’s practice of obtaining cell phone location data without a warrant is out of step
with the Court’s recent opinions. The Court can and should leave the work of ‘impos[ing]
detailed restrictions on electronic surveillance’ to Congress, as it has done before… But the
Court should first establish that the Fourth Amendment applies to cell phone location
data.145
The final chapter of this paper will provide an in-depth discussion of the oral argument in
Carpenter v. United States, and will combine that analysis with the precedents discussed in this
paper such as Olmstead, Katz, Smith, Miller, Jones, and Riley, in order to attempt to decipher
how the Court will decide the case. The discussion will seek to deduce how each justice is
thinking about the case based upon the questions and hypotheticals they posed to counsel for Mr.
Carpenter (Nathan Wessler) and for the United States (Michael Dreeben) during oral argument.
I. Carpenter Oral Argument Analysis
While predicting how a case before the Court will be decided based solely upon oral
argument can be a difficult task, the long line of precedents, combined with the questions asked
by the justices, provide a strong indication of how each justice will vote, and how this case will
be decided. Finally, based on the predicted outcome of Carpenter, the chapter will conclude
with an analysis of how the Court and Congress need to work together in order to provide the
proper legal and statutory solution to the issue of individual privacy, especially in information
provided to third parties, in the modern technology era. Combining each justice’s positions and
opinions from previous cases with their questions from oral argument gives a pretty clear picture
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that “plainly the Court is much more concerned about the privacy implications of new
technology today than it was five years ago.”146
A. Justice Neil Gorsuch
Consider Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, who could not have taken more different approaches
during oral argument. As usual, Justice Clarence Thomas was silent during oral argument. By
contrast, Justice Gorsuch was an active and insistent inquisitor of counsel. While he has not
authored many opinions on the Supreme Court, due to his short tenure, his opinion in the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States v. Ackerman reveals how Gorsuch views and
understands the government’s argument in Carpenter. In Ackerman, emails in transit that carried
the electronic signature of possible child pornography were sent to and opened by the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), without a warrant. In delivering the
opinion for a three-judge panel on the Tenth Circuit, Judge Gorsuch first found that the NCMEC
was a governmental entity, which therefore subjected it to the Fourth Amendment. He further
stated that there could be no greater analogy between the physical papers the Framers sought to
protect with the Fourth Amendment and the emails in the digital era. “Of course, the framers
were concerned with the protection of physical rather than virtual correspondence. But a more
obvious analogy from principle to new technology is hard to imagine and, indeed, many courts
have already applied the common law’s ancient trespass…doctrine to electronic, not just written,
communications.”147
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In order to strengthen the comparison between the sealed letters and private papers the
Framers sought to protect and modern electronic mail, Gorsuch applied the 1878 case Ex Parte
Jackson, noting:
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection,
wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like
warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be
seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.148
When a letter is in transit to wherever its destination may be, the government must have a
warrant in order to open the letter or package. In Ackerman the Court used United States v.
Jones’ physical trespass doctrine, taken from the Olmstead case, in order to come to the
conclusion that emails in transit were considered papers under the Fourth Amendment. Just like
the protected physical sealed mail in Ex Parte Jackson, emails now garner the same privacy
protection under the Fourth Amendment as their handwritten predecessors.
The Tenth Circuit continued analyzing the issue at hand by applying the trespass theory
under Jones, analogizing unopened email attachments to sealed letters sent through postal
services. The Court invoked a familiar analogy between physical mail and electronic mail,
thereby easing the issue into a ‘papers and effects’ argument from the Fourth Amendment.
The Court found that the warrantless opening and searching of private correspondence in the
email was ‘exactly the type of trespass to chattels that the Framers sought to prevent when
they adopted the Fourth Amendment.’149
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion requiring the same Fourth Amendment protections for emails as
physical papers, under the physical property trespass rule established in Olmstead, and applied in
Jones, provides a strong indication that he may side with Carpenter under a property-based
approach.
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Further support for this conclusion can be found from Justice Gorsuch’s questioning during
the oral argument in Carpenter during which he pressed both lawyers on the property-based
approach aspects of the Carpenter case. He began his questioning of Mr. Dreeben, counsel for
the United States, by stating, “You know, the facts here wind up looking a lot like Jones. One
thing Jones taught us is -- and reminded us, really, is that the property-based approach to privacy
also has to be considered, not just the reasonable expectation approach.”150 After establishing
this, Gorsuch moves on to use Section 222 of the Telecommunications Act, which provides that
the customer has the right, because the information is the customer’s property, to decide to
whom and when the information is given.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, what does Section 222 do, other than declare this customer
proprietary network information -MR. DREEBEN: So that -JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- that the carrier cannot disclose?
MR. DREEBEN: It -- it does that in conjunction with a provision that it shall be disclosed as
required by law.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: So -- so, let me ask you that. So -- so the government can
acknowledge a property right but then strip it of any Fourth Amendment protection. Is that
the government's position?151
Justice Gorsuch asks Mr. Dreeben if Section 222 of the Telecommunications Act says that if this
information is the property of the customer and they have the right disclose to whom they want,
when they want it, then how can the Government confer a property right and then take away all
Fourth Amendment protection that comes with it? Mr. Dreeben’s response is that the exception
to the created property right is when, as required by law, the carrier must release this
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information. In Carpenter the “as required by law” provision is the 2703(d) order for Mr.
Carpenter’s CSLI information. Gorsuch continues to question Mr. Dreeben about the
relationship between Section 222 and the Fourth Amendment.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: So the Fourth Amendment controls, not -- not what the statute says -MR. DREEBEN: Well -JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- with respect to the disclosure of the information?
MR. DREEBEN: -- the Fourth Amendment applies once the Court has identified what
interest the statute creates.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right. The statute creates customer proprietary information-MR. DREEBEN: Well, it -JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- in Section 222 and then the Fourth Amendment will determine
when it can be revealed. Right?
MR. DREEBEN: No. The statute actually creates -JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why does the statute control the Constitution? I think you are saying
the statute controls the Constitution.152
Justice Gorsuch and Mr. Dreeben have a final exchange about the Framers protecting against
third parties searching anything in a colonist’s home under writs of assistance, and how that is
analogous to what the government is doing in Carpenter. They are searching through the
property—in this case, the CSLI data of the customers—with the only restriction on the
government being the requirement that it obtain a court order based on less evidence than a
warrant backed by probable cause.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Dreeben, it seems like your whole argument boils down to if we
get it from a third party we're okay, regardless of property interest, regardless of anything
else. But how does that fit with the original understanding of the Constitution and writs of
assistance? You know, John Adams said one of the reasons for the war was the use by the
152
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government of third parties to obtain information forced them to help as their snitches and
snoops. Why -- why isn't this argument exactly what the framers were concerned about?
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think that those -- those were writs that allowed people acting
under governmental power to enter any place they wanted to search for anything that they
wanted.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Isn't that exactly your argument here, that so long as a third party's
involved, we can get anything we want?
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think the search is being carried out under a writ of assistance by a
government agent, operating under government authority; whereas here, we -- the -- if there's
a search in the acquisition cell site information, then it's the cell site company that is
acquiring that information without governmental instigation, without -JUSTICE GORSUCH: The subpoena -MR. DREEBEN: -- governmental agency -JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- being, though, the equivalent of a writ of assistance?
MR. DREEBEN: Oh, I don't think a subpoena is an equivalent of a writ of assistance. A
writ of assistance allowed the agent to go into any house, to rip open anything looking for
contraband, no limitations.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah. And you can subpoena anything that any company has
anywhere in the globe regardless of any property rights, regardless of any privacy interests,
simply because it's a third-party?
MR. DREEBEN: So I -- I think that, as Justice Alito was explaining, there is a traditional
understanding that dates back to the time of the founding that subpoenas stand on a different
footing from search warrants. And they do that because they are less intrusive, since they do
not require the government going into private property and searching itself.153
It is clear from his decision in Ackerman and his questioning at oral argument that Justice
Gorsuch understands not only modern technology, but also the privacy concerns that new
technology raises. He takes a keen interest in the property-based approach that finds its roots in
Olmstead and Jones, and in Section 222 of the Telecommunications Act in this particular case.
Gorsuch is not the only justice on the Court who may take a property-based approach to the
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Carpenter case. Justice Clarence Thomas could also decide this case under the same line of
thinking, but may not extend the potentially expansive privacy rights that Justice Gorsuch maybe
inclined to.
B. Justice Clarence Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas has a well-known, extremely judicially conservative philosophy:
“Thomas is a great deal more conservative than his colleagues, and arguably the most
conservative Justice to serve on the Supreme Court since the nineteen-thirties.”154 This
philosophy Justice Thomas often shared only with the late Justice Scalia; however, with Justice
Gorsuch now on the Court, Thomas may have gained a new partner on the far right. Due to this
philosophy, Justice Thomas often writes separately or is dissenting. His conservative judicial
philosophy, combined with his support for the majority opinion in Jones, which was based upon
the physical trespass doctrine, indicates that he may take the same property-based approach in
this case as Gorsuch may. With no hints, as always, from Justice Thomas during oral argument,
his voting record and judicial philosophy are the only clues to how Justice Thomas will vote.
Although Justice Gorsuch seems willing to extend great privacy protection to new technology
under the property-based approach, Justice Thomas’ voting history and judicial philosophy make
it unlikely he will extend privacy protections as far as Justice Gorsuch may.
C. Justice Elena Kagan
Moving away from the property-based approach, to one based on the sensitivity and intimacy
of the information gleaned from the CSLI data, Justice Elena Kagan pressed Mr. Dreeben
multiple times about how Carpenter is different than Jones. Justice Kagan, who signed onto
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Justice Alito’s opinion in Jones, appears to side firmly with Mr. Carpenter for multiple reasons
that stem from the rationale of Jones. Justice Kagan asks Mr. Dreeben how he can differentiate
Jones, where the surveillance was held to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, from the facts
in Carpenter: they both involved collecting long-term 24/7 data on an individual, albeit
employing differing means to obtain this information.
JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Dreeben, how is this different from Jones? You know, in Jones,
there were a couple of different opinions, but five justices, as -- as I count it, said this -- this
is from Justice Alito's opinion: ‘Society's expectation has been that law enforcement and
others would not, and indeed in the main simply cannot, monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual's’ -- there it was a car -- ‘for a long period.’ So how is it different
from that?
MR. DREEBEN: I think it's fundamentally different, Justice Kagan, because this involves
acquiring the business records of a provider which has determined to keep these records of
the cell site information. Jones involved government surveillance. It involved attaching a
GPS device to the car. Five members of the Court regarded that as a trespatory search. Five
other members of the Court were prepared to analyze that under reasonable expectations of
privacy. But in both cases, it was direct surveillance of the suspect in the crime.
JUSTICE KAGAN: So the question is why that should make more of a difference than the
obvious similarity between this case and Jones? And the obvious similarity is that, in both
cases, you have reliance on a new technology that allows for 24/7 tracking. Now, you're
exactly right, there were different means, but in both cases, you have a new technology that
allows for 24/7 tracking and a conclusion by a number of justices in Jones that that was an
altogether new and different thing that did intrude on people's expectations of who would be
watching them when.155
Justice Kagan concedes that the means of collection in Carpenter is different but will not
concede that the manner, detail, and length of time of the surveillance do not fall under the
location protections established in Jones. Despite this concession Justice Kagan is not willing to
concede that since the information is obtained from a third party that that means the privacy
protections established in Jones no longer matter or carry any weight at all. In fact, she sees
quite the opposite situation. She continues to push Mr. Dreeben about the length of time, and the
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intimacy of the information that can be obtained currently and in the future should the Court rule
in the United States’ favor.
JUSTICE KAGAN: Right. But, Mr. Dreeben, that could go away tomorrow. The question
here is the constitutional question, not the statutory one. So can I take you back to what, it
seems to me, is the essential identity between the factual circumstances here and in Jones,
which is that the government is getting 24/7 information. I mean, in some ways, you could
say this is more. Jones was just about a car; this is about every place that you are, whether
you're in a car or not. And you said to me that what makes it different is that you've given
the information to another person. But I recall that when you were here in the Jones case,
your theory for why that was permissible was essentially that you had given that information
to the entire public; in other words, just by being in the world, everybody sees you,
everybody watches you, and you've lost your expectation of privacy in that way. Now, we
pretty conclusively rejected that argument. Why is it different when it's giving it to one
person, the same information, this 24/7 tracking, than we said it was when you give it to the
entire world?
MR. DREEBEN: So I think that it is fundamentally different in the means that we chose to
employ in Jones versus this case, and it's also different in what information we're acquiring.
We did not acquire, in this case, 24/7 tracking of the precise movements of an individual
everywhere he went. We acquired information of the cell tower where a call started –
JUSTICE KAGAN: But let's assume you could. Let's assume Mr. Wessler is right that the -the technology keeps on getting better and better, more and more precise, it's not 10 football
fields anymore; it's half of this courtroom. Next month, it may be an eighth of this
courtroom. You know, so let's assume that we're looking ahead just a little bit and it's pretty
precision-targeting.
MR. DREEBEN: So I would say that the third-party doctrine doesn't change. I also think
that this Court could disagree and draw a line on more precise information that involves 24/7
tracking. This information is just simply far more similar to what was going on in the Smith
case, where we got dialed phone numbers that would reveal a much more precise location
where the dialed phone number came from and the person that was being spoken to. This
case does not present the Court with the opportunity to decide the kind of granularity that
Petitioner posits may happen in the future.156
The last exchange between Mr. Dreeben and Justice Kagan shows where she might come down
in Carpenter. In addition, this last exchange hints at her position on the third-party doctrine in
the digital age. She questions whether the United States feels as though simply because it
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obtained a subpoena to acquire the CSLI data from a third party, the sensitivity and intimacy of
the information CSLI data reveals should be inconsequential to the justices when deciding this
case.
JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but, Mr. Dreeben, that line of cases was developed in a period in
which third parties did not have this kind of information, valid -MR. DREEBEN: Not this kind specifically, Justice Kagan, but in the dissenting opinion in
Smith, Justice Stewart warned that you're getting incredibly intimate information when you
get the phone numbers of people who you have called. And I would submit that if the Court
thinks about it, the information you get if you know who you are calling and the inferences
you can draw about what kinds of conversations people are having are extremely sensitive
with -JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, but if -MR. DREEBEN: -- dialed phone numbers.
JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I understand what you're saying, you're basically saying, well,
because the government is going to a third-party here and doing it by subpoena, it doesn't
matter how sensitive the information is. It doesn't matter whether there's really a lack of
voluntariness on the individual's part in terms of conveying that information to the thirdparty. And we could go on and we could give, you know, other factors that you might think
in a sensible world would matter to this question. And you're saying that all of that is
trumped by the fact that the government is doing this by subpoena, rather than by setting up
its own cell towers.157
Justice Kagan is hinting that in her mind the third-party doctrine is not applicable in the digital
age, and she is looking not just at Carpenter, but the cases the Court knows will come in the
years that follow regarding digital privacy.
D. Justice Sonia Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor could not have been clearer where she stands about the third-party
doctrine in the digital age in Jones, and she reiterated her desire for an expansive privacy
protection ruling during oral argument.
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Justice Sotomayor in Jones wrote:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties… this
approach is ill suited in the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.158
As her opinion in Jones highlights, and as can be gleaned from her questions at oral argument in
Carpenter, Justice Sotomayor strongly believes that it is time to overturn the third-party doctrine
completely. For her, the analogue standard does not work in the digital era. The amount and
depth of information people must give a third party to be a functioning member of society is far
greater than anything that could have been imagined by the Court at the time of Smith and Miller.
The precision and wealth of information that third parties obtain from citizens, is an
extremely pressing concern for Sotomayor that she drives home to Mr. Wessler during the
Carpenter oral argument:
Because right now we're only talking about the cell site records, but as I understand it, a cell
phone can be pinged in your bedroom. It can be pinged at your doctor's office. It can ping
you in the most intimate details of your life. Presumably at some point even in a dressing
room as you're undressing. So I am not beyond the belief that someday a provider could turn
on my cell phone and listen to my conversations.159
Then when questioning Mr. Dreeben, she turns to her next concern about this third-party
information, and its exponentially increasing role in technological development. How can the
Court best prepare for future cases involving privacy concerns and its inevitable clash with everevolving technology? She addresses the future of the third-party doctrine and of technology and
the Fourth Amendment, again by giving a small nod to the precision and intimacy of information
that can and will be available to third parties when she discusses the individual’s cell phone
usage habits, and in particular young people:
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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Dreeben, why is it not okay, in the way we said about
beepers, to plant a beeper in somebody's bedroom, but it's okay to get the cell phone records
of someone who I -- I don't, but I know that most young people have the phones in the bed
with them…
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right? I know people who take phones into public restrooms.
They take them with them everywhere. It's an appendage now for some people. If it's not
okay to put a beeper into someone's bedroom, why is it okay to use the signals that phone is
using from that person's bedroom, made accessible to law enforcement without probable
cause?
MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Sotomayor, I will answer the question about cell phone
location in a house, but I think it's important that the Court understand that this case involves
very generalized cell sector information –
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's today, Mr. Dreeben, but we need to look at this with
respect to how the technology is developing.160
Justice Sotomayor is ready and willing to overturn the third-party doctrine in a more expansive
ruling, or at least begin to carve out exceptions, to the third-party doctrine as technology and
privacy concerns evolve.
E. Chief Justice John Roberts Jr.
Chief Justice Roberts authored the Court’s decision in Riley, which held that the police
needed a warrant to search the contents of a cellphone incident to an arrest. However, even more
important than the holding itself in Riley, the Chief Justice declared that cellphones were not
voluntary in modern life: “These cases require us to decide how the search incident to arrest
doctrine applies to modern cellphones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily
life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of
human anatomy.”161
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The Riley decision, although it does not deal directly with the third-party doctrine, carries
weight in how the Court may view Carpenter. The Chief Justice understands the privacy
implications of this case; however, he does not understand why Mr. Wessler would have the
Court draw a line stating that twenty-four hours of CSLI data would be permissible. The Chief
Justice views this case as having to deal with the clash between the analogue third-party doctrine
precedent and the realities of the digital technology age.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I want to understand the -- the basis for the 24-hour, or however
long you want it to be, exception. It seems to me if there's going to be protection extended to the
information, it has to involve some compromise of the third-party doctrine, and if that is altered,
I don't see why it wouldn't also apply to, you know, one day of information.
MR. WESSLER: So the -- the only other court to address this question is the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, which drew the line at six hours. We have suggested 24 hours because
we –
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I don't understand. What is the line we're drawing? It
seems to me the line is between information to which the authorities have access and information
to which they don't. I don't know why we're bothering about a line between six hours, three
weeks, whatever.162
Chief Justice Roberts believes that this is going to be a case where the Court may not be able
to make a narrow ruling; rather, it is going to have to be pronounced and emphatic simply due to
the facts and timing of the case. For the Chief Justice, it appears as though changes to the
doctrines of the Court must be the result of Carpenter. Based on his ruling in Riley and his
questions to Mr. Wessler, it appears that the Chief Justice believes that the third-party doctrine
must be altered in some manner or overruled because the privacy concerns raised by the new
technology outweigh the importance of the Smith and Miller precedents. Another major concern
for Roberts is whether a warrant is required for the government to obtain this information from a
cellphone, and this concern, too, stems from his opinion in Riley. He continues with his
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discussion about the application of the third-party doctrine in the technology age when Mr.
Dreeben states that individuals voluntarily give CSLI data and other information to third parties,
fully knowing all this information can be kept and shared with the government.
MR. DREEBEN: I don't think I did say that, Justice Kagan, because there is an element here
of voluntariness in deciding to contract with a cell company, just like there's an element of
voluntariness in getting a landline phone and making calls, and there's an element of
voluntariness in signing up for a bank account and using a debit card to purchase -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That -MR. DREEBEN: -- everything in your life.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- that sounds inconsistent with our decision in Riley, though,
which emphasized that you really don't have a choice these days if you want to have a cell
phone.163
Roberts is clear that the Riley decision holds considerable importance, in light of the Smith and
Miller decisions, which held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information given
voluntarily to third parties. While Roberts does not believe that this CSLI information is given
voluntarily in any sense, it is not clear how far he is willing to go in terms of extending privacy
protections remains to be seen.
F. Justice Stephen Breyer
Justice Breyer was somewhat enigmatic during oral argument. While his questions present
few clues as to how he might write the opinion of this case, they did clearly show his
understanding and appreciation for how technology has dictated a need for change to the Fourth
Amendment privacy protections.
Justice Breyer has not written a major decision concerning privacy and new technology
in the digital era, and his questions at oral argument were telling, but only to a certain extent.
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They not only suggested his personal positions, but also offered details about the Court’s
predicament in this situation. One quotation demonstrates the new territory that the Court must
now cover as technology evolves: “This is an open box. We know not where we go.”164 The
Court as Breyer sees it must adapt to the new technology because the technology has dictated
that it must.
Justice Breyer appears to be on Mr. Carpenter’s side, but he is thinking ahead, as Justice
Scalia did in Kyllo, and Justice Sotomayor did in Jones. Breyer details the difficult questions the
Court is grappling with in trying to write the opinion in a case like Carpenter that will have such
a tremendous impact on numerous Fourth Amendment cases to come to the Court. “So where
are we going? Is this the right line? How do we, in fact, write it? Not, you see, for location. I
have less trouble with that. But where is it going? Can you say -- it's a very open question, but
I'm very interested in your reactions.”165 He understands that the CSLI data should be protected
in this case, but he is trying to gauge what the decision would mean for the future privacy and
technology cases. Does the Court have to overturn the third-party doctrine completely? Can it
just carve out an exception for CSLI data? Or is there another solution that the Court should
employ? Breyer is speaking to the complex and ever-changing nature of the technology that is at
play in this case and that will be at play in future cases. While he appears to be on Mr.
Carpenter’s side in this case, if he were to write the majority opinion or a concurrence, it will
most likely be on far narrower grounds than some of his colleagues. He seems to want to have
more cases come up, and more technology develop to see exactly how the Court should handle
these situations. In addition, Breyer might establish this exception, then allow Congress to
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implement a statutory framework. Then lower courts could deal with subsequent challenges in
order to allow the Court more time to consider the issues raised by advancing technologies clash
with police power.
G. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Another Justice who showcased the difficulty that the Court would have with drawing a
bright line regarding when or how long 24/7 surveillance of a citizen would become a Fourth
Amendment violation was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. While she, too, has not written a major
decision in this line of cases, she did seem to be firmly on the side of Mr. Carpenter and baffled,
just as was Chief Justice Roberts, by the standard that Mr. Wessler was suggesting.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Now, suppose what was sought here was the CSLI information for
the day of each robbery, just one day, the day of each robbery. Does that qualify as short
term in your view that would not violate the Fourth Amendment?
MR. WESSLER: So the -- Your Honor, the -- the rule we proposed would be a single 24hour period, contiguous 24-hour period… So we don't think the Court needs to -- to draw a
bright line here, to define exactly where the line between short and long term is, but as we -as we pointed out in our reply brief.
Justice Ginsburg is trying to see what standard Mr. Wessler would like the Court to apply
since, as was discussed in Jones, longer-term surveillance was a violation under the Fourth
Amendment. Ginsburg is attempting to ascertain what is considered longer term and therefore
an intrusion on Mr. Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment protections. The standard that Mr. Wessler
produces, one single twenty-four hour period of CSLI data, highlights how difficult this decision
could be if the Court attempts to find a bright line rule for the number of hours the government
can obtain CSLI data without a warrant. It may have to be a sweeping “all-or-nothing” ruling in
this case due to the nature of the technology and the 2703(d) order that are at odds here. This
expansive type of decision is where Justice Ginsburg may land, since, as noted above, she was
unsatisfied with Mr. Wessler’s attempt to draw the time line for CSLI data. She highlights one
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of the main flaws with the single 24-hour standard that Mr. Wessler has put forth before the
Court:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Wessler, could we go back to my question? You said 24 hours
roughly. So, if there were only one robbery, we could get that information, but now there are
how many, eight? So we can't get it for eight, but we can get it for the one?
MR. WESSLER: So, Your Honor, we've suggested 24 hours. I think that the most
administrable line, if the Court wishes to draw a bright line, would be a single 24-hour
period. But this Court could -- could craft other reasonable ways to -- to draw that intentional
line.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, what if it's reasonable for one robbery one day, why wouldn't
it be reasonable -- equally reasonable for each other robbery?166
Although it appears that Ginsburg is firmly on the side of Mr. Carpenter, she is also strongly
opposed to the rule of one continuous twenty-four hour period of permitted warrantless CSLI
data gathering by the government. She does not see how that is applicable to many cases, even
the one in carpenter where the different robberies occurred on different days.
H. Justice Samuel Alito Jr.
The final two Justices on the Court, Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito, are the only two who
do not appear to at least lean in the direction of Mr. Carpenter; however, they may do so for
different reasons. There are a few separate reasons why Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito may
not decide the case in Mr. Carpenter’s favor. First, they both believe legislation, like the
statutory frameworks discussed in chapter three, provide a better solution to the balancing
problem of police power and individual privacy. The second reason is that neither justice
seemed convinced by Mr. Wessler’s arguments that the information obtained from CSLI data is
any more sensitive or intimate than the information obtained by the government in Smith and
Miller. In addition, Justice Alito, who acknowledged in his concurrence in Jones, that
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technology has changed how and what privacy means in the digital age did so again at oral
argument in Carpenter. However this is where his agreement with Mr. Wessler ends; he
understands that technology has changed, but is not sure if that requires the Court to overturn in
part or in full the third-party doctrine.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, you know, Mr. Wessler, I -- I agree with you that this new
technology is raising very serious privacy concerns, but I need to know how much of existing
precedent you want us to overrule or declare obsolete. And if I could, I'd just like to take you
back briefly to -- to Miller and ask on what grounds that can be distinguished. You don't say
we should overrule it, and you had - you said the information here is more sensitive. We
maybe could agree to disagree about that. I don't know. But what else? What -- on what
other ground can Miller possibly be distinguished?167
Justice Alito wants to know why, even though the technology in the cases is extremely different,
the third-party doctrine, established in Smith and Miller, should not be used to decide this case.
One of the ways that Mr. Wessler attempts to do this is by distinguishing the level of sensitivity
and intimacy in the information extracted from the CSLI data in Carpenter and the financial
information obtained in Miller.
JUSTICE ALITO: How would you distinguish Miller?
MR. WESSLER: Miller involved more limited records, certainly they could reveal some
sensitive information, but more limited records and, as this Court held, they were voluntarily
conveyed in that they were created by the passing of negotiable instruments into the stream
of commerce to transfer funds. What we have here is both more sensitive and less voluntary.
JUSTICE ALITO: Why is it more -- why is it more sensitive? Why is cell site location
information more sensitive than bank records, which particularly today, when a lot of people
don't use cash much, if at all, a bank record will disclose purchases? It will not only disclose
-- everything that the person buys, it will not only disclose locations, but it will disclose
things that can be very sensitive.
MR. WESSLER: I absolutely agree, Justice Alito, that the information in bank records can
be quite sensitive, but what it cannot do is chart a minute-by-minute account of a person's
locations and movements and associations over a long period regardless of what the person is
doing at any given moment.
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JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, I understand that. But why is that more sensitive than bank records
that show, for example, periodicals to which a person -- to which a person subscribes or
hotels where a person has stayed or entertainment establishments -- establishments that a
person has visited.168
Justice Alito is not sold on the idea that simply because the technology is more advanced, that
means that the information revealed by it will be more sensitive than the information disclosed in
Miller.
I. Justice Anthony Kennedy
Immediately following this questioning from Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy enters the
argument, clearly showing that he, too, is not accepting the argument that the information is
more sensitive than that in Miller simply because the technology is more advanced.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Particularly because the information in the bank records that Justice
Alito referred to are not publicly known. Your whereabouts are publicly known. People can
see you. Surveillance officers can follow you. It seems to me that this is much less private
than -- than the case that Justice Alito is discussing.169
Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice Alito sees the distinguishing factor between the sensitivity
of the information disclosed in Miller and the sensitivity of the information disclosed in
Carpenter.
The next part of their questioning of Mr. Wessler is rooted in Justice Alito’s concurrence in
Jones, where he said that deciding cases like Carpenter, where new technology collides with
privacy interests, should be left to Congress to decide, not the Court. In Jones Justice Alito said,
“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns
may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to
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draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”170
Justice Kennedy used this idea to question Mr. Wessler about whether the Court should defer to
the judgment of Congress, since Congress has passed many statutes regulating law
enforcement’s use of new technology due to citizens’ privacy concerns.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But your argument, as I understood it from the brief and I'm hearing
it today, makes the Stored Communications Act and the 2703(d) order irrelevant. You don't
even talk about it. In an area where we're searching for a compromise, where it's difficult to
draw a line, why shouldn't we give very significant weight to the Congress's determination
that there should be and will be some judicial supervision over this -- over -- over these
investigations?
MR. WESSLER: Justice Kennedy, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act in
1986 and amended it in relevant part in 1994. Three-tenths of 1 percent of Americans had
cell phones in 1986, only 9 percent in 1994. There were about 18,000 cell towers in 1994.
Today there are over 300,000. And -JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, you mean -- you mean the Act was more necessary when there
were fewer cell phones?
MR. WESSLER: No, not -- not -JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me just the opposite.
MR. WESSLER: Not at all, Your Honor. My point is that Congress quite clearly was not
thinking about the existence of and certainly not law enforcement interest in historical cell
site location information. There is nothing in the historical legislative record for -- for the
members of the Court who would look there to indicate any cognizance of these kinds of
records. So -JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, again, my question is, you give zero weight in your arguments
to the fact that there is some protection?171
Thus, it appears that both Kennedy and Alito do not agree that the information at issue in
Carpenter is any more sensitive than that at issue in the third-party doctrine foundation cases.
Nor do they appear to acknowledge that the Court is the proper venue for deciding the complex
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issue of what to do with the third-party doctrine, and its relationship to the battle between the
citizens’ privacy and law enforcement ability to do its job effectively and properly.
II. “This is an Open Box. We Know not Where We Go.”172
Based on existing precedent and the questioning at oral argument, it seems clear that the
Court is extremely concerned about the digital privacy implications involved in Carpenter;
however, what those implications are, what actions needs to be taken, and by what governmental
body remain uncertain. The final part of this paper will discuss the best solution that the Court
should put forward in its opinion in Carpenter, not only as a solution to CSLI data, but also as a
foundation for deciding future technology cases. In addition, Congress’ role in developing a
complementary statutory framework with the Supreme Court decision will be addressed.
New technology presents both the Court and Congress with new privacy concerns daily, and
this is why the solution to these issues must come from the Court and Congress working
together. As was stated early in the chapter, Justice Breyer said at oral argument in Carpenter,
“This is an open box. We know not where we go.”173 This quote provides a solid summary of
where the Court is in dealing with the privacy concerns that technology presents, and where
Congress is in terms of aiding members of the Court to find the balance between privacy
interests of citizens and law enforcement’s ability to do their jobs in the most effective manner
possible. The “open box” that Justice Breyer is referring to is technology and the issues it
presents to the Court and to Congress in Carpenter. However, his statement
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is not solely concerned with the technology -- the CSLI data – at issue in Carpenter. Rather it is
looking beyond and into the ever-advancing technology, and the privacy cases that the new
technology will bring before the Court.
Breyer is also pointing out that the Court has not dealt with modern technology and privacy
concerns, such as those raised by CSLI data being obtained through the simple use of a court
order, and, therefore, this is new territory that raises a completely new set of issues that neither
the Framers nor the Court that decided Smith and Miller could have imagined. This one quote
from oral argument encapsulates the grounds upon which this decision needs to occur. However,
while Carpenter represents extremely valid and important privacy concerns, is not the correct
vehicle for a sweeping and expansive Fourth Amendment ruling.
The technology is changing so fast, and the Court’s precedents are too far behind, for the
Court to make a sweeping and expansive ruling without allowing time for Congress to play the
critical fact-finding and research role. The Court understands that these questions must be dealt
with now, because as Justice Roberts noted in Riley, “We expect that the gulf between physical
practicability and digital capacity will only continue to widen in the future.”174 Roberts is
making the point that the Court understands that technology is only going to advance with each
passing day.
Consistent with Justice Breyer’s concern, the Justices appear to understand the crossroads at
which they stand when it comes to technology and privacy, and there are two options. Option
number one is to rule expansively for Mr. Carpenter, by overturning Smith and Miller, and
requiring a warrant backed by probable cause to obtain CSLI data. This type of ruling is illadvised because it does not fully consider the future. This paper has discussed how the justices
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have, for the most part, been extremely forward-thinking about the technology that would be
coming, beginning with Justice Brandeis in Olmstead:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop at wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enable to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.175
Similarly, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo, discussing the use of a thermal imager to determine
the heat signature of rooms inside of a man’s house, wrote, “While the technology used in the
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.”176
III. Expansive and Sweeping Privacy Decision v. Narrow and Cautious Decision
All of these earlier technology decisions have considered the future, and allowed for the
development of case law as the technology required, but overturning the third-party doctrine, and
requiring a warrant for the obtaining of CSLI data would not allow for this. It would allow for
the Court to override its own established practice in this area, and this type of preclusion has
backfired on the Court before. In Miller and Smith, the Court took broad and expansive steps in
the opposite direction by allowing government unfettered access to any information given
voluntarily to a third party. Granted, the Justices deciding those cases could not have predicted
CSLI data, but they could have taken a more cautious and narrowly drawn position when crafting
the third-party doctrine. However, as a result of these decisions, Congress realized that the Court
had made too sweeping and expansive a ruling. “In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Devices Statute,”177 which required a Court order to install a pen
register to obtain the numbers a suspect has dialed, and “In response to Miller, Congress enacted
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the Right to Financial Privacy Act (‘RFPA’),”178 which limited government access to “The
information contained in the financial records of any customer from a financial institution’ where
the Fourth Amendment, thanks to Miller, does not.”179 The RFPA set forth standards and
requirements in order to obtain financial information. When the Court has made expansive and
sweeping decisions about the use of technology and the privacy interests that surround them,
Congress has been able to limit the scope of the decisions through the legislative process,
whereby, unlike the Court, it can conduct research and better understand the impact that
technology is having on citizens in this country and their privacy interests.
This ability of Congress to react to the expansive and consequential decisions handed down
by the Court in previous technology and privacy-based cases is the reason why the second option
below is the correct answer. Not only is it the right answer to the questions presented in
Carpenter but also in all of the technology based cases requiring the Court to balance Fourth
Amendment privacy protections against law enforcement’s use of new technology to do its job.
The second option, and the one that the Court should adopt, will be one that has the Court
rightfully outline the privacy parameters that the Fourth Amendment provides for, and will give
Congress ample room to perform its legislative function. Chief Justice Roberts alludes to the
fact that cases dealing with modern technology will require the balancing of privacy rights and
the security that police are able to provide, and that some sacrifices have to made by citizens in
order to obtain new, or retain old privacy rights as technology advances.
We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law
enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in facilitating
coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide
valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost.180
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This sentiment that there will have to be a trade-off between privacy and security was echoed
by Justice Alito in Jones.
But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to
periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant
changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or security
at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if
the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may
eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.181
However, in Jones, Justice Alito made the opposite argument that new technology that can
provide for better security from law enforcement will have to come at the expense of privacy
instead of privacy coming at the cost of security, as Roberts said in Riley. The trade-off between
security and privacy will require the input of the Court and Congress in order to balance these
potentially competing interests in the most effective, fair and constitutionally sound way
possible.
Under the second option, the Court should require law enforcement to obtain a warrant in
order to acquire CSLI data, no matter how long the tracking period. No longer will a 2703(d)
order be the standard; instead, a warrant backed by probable cause should be required, and as a
result, Carpenter should result in another exception to, and not the overturning of, the third-party
doctrine. This exception is based on several factors. First, the third-party doctrine is premised
on individuals losing all expectations of privacy when information is voluntarily given to a third
party.182 However, as a result of Riley, owning a cell phone is no longer viewed as voluntary in
modern society. Chief Justice Roberts made it abundantly clear in that opinion that owning and
using a cell phone was no longer a luxury or an option, but instead has become a requirement of
everyday life. A standard whereby information voluntarily given to a third party loses all
181
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privacy protections is no longer satisfied, since Riley states that owning a cell phone is no longer
voluntary. “Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of
American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every
aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”183 The location information in
Carpenter, produced by a cell phone and retained by a third party, no longer should be accessible
by government with a simple 2703(d) order.
The second reason why CSLI data should require a warrant is that the information obtained
from CSLI data is far more revealing and intimate in nature than anything the Court could have
imagined when the Smith and Miller decisions were written. The contents of modern cellphones,
especially modern smart phones, will show every facet of a person’s life, from medical records,
financial records, and information about the interior of their home. However, while the issue in
Carpenter is simply the location information that the phone gives off when it pings cell site
towers, this information is more intimate and revealing than the location information obtained in
the Jones case. In Jones all the government could track was the whereabouts of Mr. Jones’ car,
not his physical person. By contrast, in Carpenter, the CSLI data shows every place he has been,
and not only his location, but even what floor of a building a person is on. Justice Sotomayor
made the point at oral argument—people take their phones into public restrooms, dressing
rooms, and even in the case of most young people, in bed with them at night.184 This CSLI data
is infallible and incorruptible; and it is not at the mercy of human memory, or determined by the
location of a suspect’s car. It is a detailed map of every movement a person has made inside and
outside of his home. The intimacy of this information is in no way, shape, or form comparable to
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the information that was obtained in Smith and Miller. The technology involved in those cases
simply obtained the numbers a person dialed, and the deposit slips from bank transactions.
Those analogue era pieces of information do not in any way reveal what time one leaves one’s
house for work every morning, what time one goes to lunch at the office, or where one eats, and
they especially do not reveal what room one is in in one’s home.
The modern digital era location information showing every place a person has been, cannot
be held to the same standard that the analogue third-party doctrine, intended for phone numbers
and deposit slips from over four decades ago: “This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks.”185 Cellphones are not a voluntary part of being a functional
member of society in the digital age, and the information the CSLI data reveals about an
individual cannot be compared to the miniscule amount of information that could be gleaned by
the government in the original third-party doctrine cases. For these reasons the Court must carve
out an exception to the third-party doctrine for CSLI information, and require that a warrant
backed by probable cause be obtained by the government before it can obtain CSLI data, for any
length of time on an individual.
While some may object and say that the statutory framework provided in the
Telecommunications Act and Stored Communications Act clearly states that only a 2703(d)
order is required to obtain this information, Congress is not the arbiter and interpreter of the
Constitution. It is one of the oldest principles in America that the Supreme Court is the
interpreter of the Constitution and, therefore, the Fourth Amendment. “It is emphatically the
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province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”186 It is the duty of the Court
to set the privacy standards that are required by the Fourth Amendment. Once the Court has set
this standard, the second part of the solution to the questions raised by new technology, such as
determining the actual societal expectations of privacy, and the trade-offs individuals are willing
to make between security and personal privacy, can begin to be answered by a statutory
framework created by Congress.
But Congress should follow the lead of the Court as new conflicts between law enforcement
practices, emerging technology, and Fourth Amendment privacy protections emerge…
(‘Privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment is first and foremost the responsibility of
the courts.’). With the Court’s constitutional guidance, Congress can take its turn and enact
privacy legislation ‘that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or
[] other variables.’187
Congress will no doubt play an important role in finding the right balance between personal
privacy and law enforcement needs. It can build upon the constitutional groundwork that the
Court provides in Carpenter and the cases it will decide in the future. Congress is far better
suited to deal with these questions, once the Court has decided the constitutional question,
because is has a wide range of resources at its disposal that the Court simply does not.
Legislatures can call and conduct hearings, selecting the number and types of witnesses and
experts who testify before them. Legislatures act in an overly prospective manner, not bound
to the facts of circumstances of any particular case or controversy. Legislatures can hear
from dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of ‘parties’ in the form of live testimony and
submitted written comments. And legislatures can amend their earlier enactments whenever
they like, and whenever circumstances change. Courts, on the other hand, are constrained by
the evidence, witnesses, and experts proffered by the parties. Courts act retrospectively,
seeking primarily to resolve the disputes before the.188
More specifically, Congress is not limited by cases that are granted certiorari. Congress can
identify a problem, research it, and try to find a solution, and it does not have to wait for an issue
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to come to it, as does the Court. The only restriction placed on Congress is the Constitution, and
once the Court has decided the constitutional question, it is up to Congress to use its resources
and capabilities to fix the remaining imbalance between personal privacy and law enforcement
powers.
Congress has the capability to interview experts, and hear from citizens and other interested
parties about what they expect in terms of privacy, and balance that with what law enforcement
officials tell Congress they need in order to effectively do their job. This combination of a
narrow opinion by the Court in Carpenter and Congress’ implementation of a statutory
framework provides the most comprehensive and workable solution to the questions presented
by modern technology in the digital age.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has detailed the case law, the scholarly frameworks, and the legislation leading up
to one of the most important cases of the 2017-2018 Supreme Court term, and one of the most
important modern Fourth Amendment decisions. If the Court should rule on expansive and
sweeping grounds, overruling the third-party doctrine and requiring a warrant for CSLI data, that
solution will be hailed as a great decision for citizens’ privacy, but it may come at the cost of
citizens’ security. Congress may also decide that doing so would tip the scale too far in the
direction of citizen privacy, and it may enact statutes designed to restore balance between police
power and individual privacy. If the Court takes the proper, narrower approach, then it will give
Congress and the Court sufficient time within which to evaluate, adapt, and apply the new Fourth
Amendment laws to the changing technology.
The Court’s jurisprudence has come a long way from the time of Olmstead and the physical
trespass doctrine, the time of Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the time of
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Smith and Miller and the creation of the unfettered third-party doctrine, and the time of the
statutory protections of the ECPA and the Telecommunications Act. The Court has arrived at the
time of Jones, Riley, and now Carpenter. The Carpenter case presents, just as Riley did, a
chance for the Chief Justice to write a unanimous decision even though some justices are likely
to write concurrences. Chief Justice Roberts authored one of the most important cases decided
during his tenure in the Riley decision, which revolved around cell phone privacy laws. The
Chief Justice understands the real-world impact of the Fourth Amendment technology cases, and
he is keenly aware of power that unanimous vote in Carpenter would carry.
From the analysis in this chapter it is clear that the Chief Justice may not have trouble
reaching that unanimous decision for Mr. Carpenter, but his real challenge lies in the different
approaches the Justices will take. If the Chief Justice keeps this opinion for himself or he gives
the opinion to Justice Breyer he will most likely see multiple concurrences like the opinion from
Jones. The approach the Chief Justice will take based upon the oral argument and past decisions
will be one that Justice Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan will fully sign onto and endorse. In
addition, depending on whether he requires the government to get a warrant before obtaining the
CSLI data, he may receive the vote of Sotomayor in agreement with his judgment in the case, but
not with his reasoning.
The same situation would play out if the opinion were handed to Justice Breyer. Should the
Chief or Justice Breyer write the majority opinion there will be at least three separate and defined
concurrences. The first will be written by Justice Gorsuch and will agree in the judgment for Mr.
Carpenter, but he will base his reasoning on the property-centered approach to the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Thomas would most likely sign onto at least part of Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion, depending on how expansive the privacy protection granted by Justice Gorsuch will be.
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The second concurrence would come form Justice Alito who would have Justice Kennedy sign
on, most likely, in full to his concurrence. Justice Alito would write an opinion that would be
extremely close to the one he wrote in Jones. While it would declare Mr. Carpenter had a
reasonable expectation to privacy in his information, it would not go any further than this,
because Justice Alito would write that this issue should be solved by a statutory framework put
forth by Congress. The final concurrence would come from Justice Sotomayor who would agree
with the outcome in favor of Mr. Carpenter, but would not agree in terms of the limited privacy
protections granted to Mr. Carpenter. Justice Sotomayor suggests the third-party doctrine needs
to be overturned because it is an analogue precedent that is still alive in the digital era. In
addition, this analogue precedent will only become more and more inapplicable to modern
society as technology becomes more invasive into people’s lives.
The Carpenter case sets the stage for the Chief Justice to build upon his digital privacy
jurisprudence that he began in Riley. He understands the importance, the implications, and the
consequences of digital privacy decisions, and he also understands he could play a defining role
in laying the foundations in an area of constitutional law, digital privacy, that could last decades
after he is no longer Chief Justice. In this respect, he is like Chief Justice Taft in Olmstead. The
Court knows that technology will continue to change, evolve, and adapt to modern times, as will
society’s expectations of privacy, and its willingness to make certain trade-offs, such as security
in the name of personal privacy. Nevertheless as long as technology continues to evolve, and
questions about how best to balance personal privacy and police power continue to be raised, it
will be the Court’s “[p]urpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can
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properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and
extent of such protection is.”189
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